• Allegheny College
    Department of Philosophy And Religious Studies
    Visiting Assistant Professor
Syracuse University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2005
Neason Hill, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  87
    Ned Markosian argues (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:213-228, 1998a; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a, The Monist 87:405-428, 2004b) that simples are ‘maximally continuous’ entities. This leads him to conclude that there could be non-particular ‘stuff’ in addition to things. I first show how an ensuing debate on this issue McDaniel (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2):265-275, 2003); Markosian (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:332-340, 2004a) ended in deadloc…Read more
  •  8
    Temporally Restricted Composition
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 431-440. 2017.
    I develop and defend a novel answer to Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question,’ namely, under what conditions do some things compose and object? My answer is that things will compose an object when and only when they exist simultaneously relative to a reference frame. I then show how this view wards off objections given to ‘Unrestricted Mereology’. TREC, unlike other theories of Restricted Composition, does not fall prey to worries about vagueness, anthropocentrism, or arbitrariness. …Read more
  •  179
    Psychological Altruism (PA) is the view that everyone, ultimately, acts altruistically all the time. I defend PA by showing strong prima facie support, and show how a reinterpretive strategy against supposed counterexamples is successful. I go on to show how PA can be argued for in ways which exactly mirror the arguments for an opposing view, Psychological Egoism. This shows that the case for PA is at least as plausible as PE. Since the case for PA is not plausible, neither is that for PE
  •  119
    The Metaphysics of Mass Expressions
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
  • From five plausible premises about ordinary objects it follows that ordinary objects are either functions, fictions or processes. Assuming that the function and fiction accounts of ordinary objects are not plausible, in this paper I develop and defend a (non-Whiteheadian) process account of ordinary objects. I first offer an extended deduction that argues for mereological essentialism for masses or quantities, and then offer an inductive argument in favor of interpreting ordinary objects as proc…Read more
  •  58
    Chisholm’s changing conception of ordinary objects
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1): 1-56. 2008.
    Roderick Chisholm changed his mind about ordinary objects. Circa 1973-1976, his analysis of them required the positing of two kinds of entities—part-changing ens successiva and non-part-changing, non-scatterable primary objects. This view has been well noted and frequently discussed (e.g., recently in Gallois 1998 and Sider 2001). Less often treated is his later view of ordinary objects (1986-1989), where the two kinds of posited entities change, from ens successiva to modes, and, while retainin…Read more