•  8273
    Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant's Ethics
    In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik, Duncker Und Humblot. 1997.
    I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory of relevant descriptions
  •  1023
    Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics
    In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik, Duncker Und Humblot. 1994.
    An examination of Kant's doctrine of radical evil as set forth in Book I of Religion.
  •  1009
    This article begins with the claim that the Formula of Universal Law, interpreted as a test of the deontic status of actions, can't be made to work. If not, then one might wonder whether what other work it might do in the overall economy of Kant's ethics. I defend what I call the "formal constraint" interpretation of FUL, explaining how it can figure in a defense of the Formula of Humanity, and its psychological significance in moral thinking
  •  846
    Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology
    In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 1996.
  •  760
    The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons
    In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 77-98. 2021.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussio…Read more
  •  757
    New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 447-465. 1991.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of…Read more
  •  664
    In Chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. Here we argue that this metaethical position, which we will henceforth call ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. We do so by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that we have used before against other views that posit moral properti…Read more
  •  529
    Cognitivist expressivism
    In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Oxford University Press. pp. 255--298. 2006.
  •  466
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relation…Read more
  •  349
    Some contemporary intepreters of Kant maintain that on Kant's view fulfilling duties of virtue require doing so from the motive of duty. I argue that there are interpretive and doctinal reasons for rejecting this interpretation. However, I argue that for Kant motives can be deontically relevant; one's motives can affect the deontic status of actions.
  •  335
    This chapter argues for an interpretation of Kant's psychology of moral evil that accommodates the so-called excluded middle cases and allows for variations in the magnitude of evil. The strategy involves distinguishing Kant's transcendental psychology from his empirical psychology and arguing that Kant's character rigorism is restricted to the transcendental level. The chapter also explains how Kant's theory of moral evil accommodates 'the badass'; someone who does evil for evil's sake.
  •  309
    Moral Theory: An Introduction
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2001.
    Moral Theory explores some of the most historically important and currently debated moral theories about the nature of the right and good. After introducing students in the first chapter to some of the main aims and methods of evaluating a moral theory, the remaining chapters are devoted to an examination of various moral theories including the divine command theory, moral relativism, natural law theory, Kant's moral theory, moral pluralism, virtue ethics, and moral particularism
  •  279
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380
  •  257
    Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism
    Noûs 36 (s1): 74-96. 2002.
    Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that is in…Read more
  •  215
    What does moral phenomenology tell us about moral objectivity?
    Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 267-300. 2008.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences …Read more
  •  197
    Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 279-295. 2007.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has…Read more
  •  193
    Moral phenomenology and moral theory
    Philosophical Issues 15 (1). 2005.
  •  186
    Copping out on moral twin earth
    Synthese 124 (1-2): 139-152. 2000.
    In "Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth", David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist.
  •  151
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic
    Philosophical Papers 29 (2): 121-153. 2000.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual s…Read more
  •  149
    Moral realism: A defense
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 265-269. 2007.
  •  146
    Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1): 115-131. 2008.
    Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality …Read more
  •  139
    This paper contains an overview of the essays contained in the Mind and morals anthology plus a critical discussion of certain themes raised in many of these essays concerning the bearing of recent work in cognitive science on the traditional project of moral theory. Specifically, I argue for the following claims: (1) authors like Virginia Held, who appear to be antagonistic toward the methodological naturalism of Owen Flanagan, Andy Clark, Paul Churchland, and others, are really in fundamental …Read more
  •  135
    What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1): 25-51. 2009.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its app…Read more
  •  125
    Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1 73-98. 2006.
  •  115
    Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpetative Essays (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2002.
    This is the only book devoted entirely to The Metaphysics of Morals. Seventeen essays by leading contemporary Kant scholars cover such topics as Kant's views on rights, punishment, contract, practical reasoning, revolution, freedom, virtue, legislation, happiness, moral judgement, love, respect, duties to oneself, and motivation.
  •  108
    Metaethics After Moore (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2006.
    Metaethics, understood as a distinct branch of ethics, is often traced to G. E. Moore's 1903 classic, Principia Ethica. Whereas normative ethics is concerned to answer first order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second order non-moral questions about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and discourse. Moore has continued to exert a powerful influence, and the sixteen essays here represent the most up-to-date …Read more