Markus Dubber

This 44-chapter volume tackles a quickly-evolving field of inquiry, mapping the existing discourse as part of a general attempt to place current developments in historical context; at the same time, breaking new ground in taking on novel subjects and pursuing fresh approaches. The term "A.I." is used to refer to a broad range of phenomena, from machine learning and data mining to artificial general intelligence. The recent advent of more sophisticated AI systems, which function with partial or full autonomy and are capable of tasks which require learning and 'intelligence', presents difficult ethical questions, and has drawn concerns from many quarters about individual and societal welfare, democratic decision-making, moral agency, and the prevention of harm. This work ranges from explorations of normative constraints on specific applications of machine learning algorithms today-in everyday medical practice, for instance-to reflections on the (potential) status of AI as a form of consciousness with attendant rights and duties and, more generally still, on the conceptual terms and frameworks necessarily to understand tasks requiring intelligence, whether "human" or "A.I."

This chapter notes the complex and unsatisfying efforts to distinguish between punishment and regulation, and reframes the discussion of punishment and regulation by labeling the former law and the latter police. Doing so relocates this classification in a particular historical genealogy. Reconceptualizing the terms of the discussion suggests that while law operates on the individual, the object of police regulation tends to be collective. One of the distinctions frequently invoked as crucial to the difference between punishment and regulation is the difference between private and public. However, the notion of private law and public regulation relies on an overly simplistic model and history of law. Comparing punishment and regulation is like comparing apples and oranges, because they are two fundamentally different things. Regulation is an empty label unless it is combined with a mode of governance. That mode of governance, which parallels and complements law, is the concept of police. Police and law are contemporary manifestations of the ancient Greek distinction between household governance and public governance.

Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law presents essays in which scholars from various countries and legal systems engage critically with formative texts in criminal legal thought since Hobbes. It examines the emergence of a transnational canon of criminal law by documenting its intellectual and disciplinary history and provides a snapshot of contemporary work on criminal law within that historical and comparative context. Criminal law discourse has become, and will continue to become, more international and comparative, and in this sense global: the long-standing parochialism of criminal law scholarship and doctrine is giving way to a broad exploration of the foundations of modern criminal law. The present book advances this promising scholarly and doctrinal project by making available key texts, including several not previously available in English translation, from the common law and civil law traditions, accompanied by contributions from leading representatives of both systems.