Martin Palecek

The “ontological turn” is a recent movement within cultural anthropology. Its proponents want to move beyond a representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as systems of belief that provide different perspectives on a single world. Authors who write in this vein move from talk of many cultures to many “worlds,” thus appearing to affirm a form of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of Donald Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays.

Při výběru z teorií, které bychom mohli aplikovat na problém, jímž se zabýváme, je pro nás účinnost jejich použití jedním z nejdůležitějších kritérií. Jinými slovy, naše hodnocení teorií se odvíjí o jejich schopnosti řešit problémy. V tomto eseji nejprve ukáži, jaké druhy problémů jsou pro sociální vědy klíčové, a s pomocí strukturalistické kritiky funkcionalismu nabídnu ilustrace těchto problémů. Budu přitom tvrdit, že Lévi-Straussovy přísliby spojené s jeho metodou nebyly nikdy naplněny a že je strukturální antropologie neuspokojivá.

When Tooby and Cosmides published their famous article “Psychological foundation of culture”, most readers could read it as just another paper addressing evolutionary psychology. Its aspirations were, however, much far-reaching. Tooby and Cosmides attacked the so-called constructivists. In this way, the paper ushered in another turn in the controversy over the method of social sciences. In my paper I claim that Tooby and Cosmides are right when they criticize constructivists and relativists. On the other hand, I claim that they do not live up to their aspirations, i.e. they do not provide for a rapprochement of the standards of social sciences and those of natural sciences

This article evaluates the idea of the modularity of mind and domain specificity. This concept has penetrated the behavioral disciplines, and in the case of some of these—for example, the cognitive study of religion—has even formed their foundation. Although the theoretical debate relating to the idea of modularity is ongoing, this debate has not been reflected in the use of modularity in behavioral research. The idea of domain specificity or modularity of mind is not without its controversies, and there is no consensus regarding its acceptance. Many neuroscientists, as well as several evolutionary psychologists and philosophers, have raised a number of objections that cannot remain overlooked. I will show the areas in which the idea is problematic, what attempts have been made to preserve it, and how social scientific research can move beyond post-Fodorian modularity without losing any valuable insights.