Marvin Belzer

Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that reductionism contravenes common sense, so I revisit the debate between Parfit and Lewis, showing why Parfit wins it. Is reductionism about persons then inherently at odds with the unity reaction? Not necessarily; David Velleman presents a reductionist theory according to which fission does not conflict with the unity reaction. Nonetheless, relying on the distinction between person level descriptions of first-person states and the first-person perspective itself, I argue that Velleman's theory does not eliminate fission-based conflict with the unity reaction. Footnotesa * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the philosophy departments at Rutgers University and Bowling Green State University. I am indebted to many members of these audiences, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their comments—especially Frank Arntzenius, Michael Bradie, David Copp, John Finnis, Jerry Fodor, Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Colin McGinn, Fred Miller, Mark Moyer, David Oderberg, Marya Schechtman, David Schmidtz, David Sobel, and Sara Worley. Special thanks to David Sanford. I am also grateful to graduate students in my seminar at Bowling Green during the spring of 2003, for urging me to take seriously the grip of the unity reaction; I am especially grateful for the comments of Nico Maloberti, Jonathan Miller, John Milliken, Robyn Peabody, Jennifer Sproul, Jessica Teaman, and Sherisse Webb.

In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of “we-intention” plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela’s concept of “we-intention”. Tuomela’s introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions and social actions are analogous relative to the role of a concept of intention in those theories. This assumption is criticized; and a number of difficulties with the new concept are discussed.

The most important problem is philosophical deontic logic is to determine the logical form of expressions of conditional obligation. The dissertation shows first that this problem is closely related to David Lewis's well-known "problem about permission"--a problem concerning the characterization of changes in normative systems. The dissertation contains a solution to the problem about permission, as well as an argument that expressions of conditional obligation cannot be represented satisfactorily by means of some combination of monadic deontic operators and a counterfactual conditional . ;Lewis formulates the problem about permission in terms of a language game for imperative and permission sentences. In order to solve the problem it is necessary first to point out the shortcoming in Lewis's game that it cannot be used satisfactorily to provide semantics for "contrary to duty" imperatives. Having revised the game it is possible to define the concept of relative defeasibility between imperatives. It is in terms of this concept that a solution to the problem about permission is formulated. ;The "revised game" is used as well to discuss problems concerning reasoning from sets of rules, principles, and facts to "all things considered" conclusions. It is argued that two distinct senses or uses of 'ought' must be distinguished in order to represent such reasoning satisfactorily. The role of the notion ceteris paribus is discussed. The notion is given a precise definition in terms of the possible worlds semantics of the "revised game" and it is argued that the notion is not as significant in normative reasoning as commonly is supposed. An alternative notion is defined and defended