Mary Ellen Nielsen

I suggest a description of the theory that I find applicable to understanding self-knowledge. The theory of its own complexity focuses on the structure of individual thoughts about themselves. Own complexity concerns two features of a person's self-determination: the number of social roles that a person has, and the ability of a person to differentiate among these roles. For example, I would be considered a weak bearer of the idea of ​​my own complexity if I considered myself as the bearer of a relatively small number of roles and I would describe existing roles as similar to those that I carry out. I would have a greater degree of my own complexity if I looked at the number of roles I increased and made more distinctions between them.

Religion has a serious impact on our world. Most people in the world consider themselves to be religious or those to whom religion has a significant impact. It also helps to determine the type of culture that forms political and economic views. In an individual dimension, religion affects human communication. Although it can be viewed as a means by which society controls its members, it is more than just a social and managerial phenomenon. Religion is a human attempt to achieve spirituality. It is our attempt to gain and maintain the meaning of our destination in the world, which sometimes seems pointless.

If it is true, as suggested by Sir Michael Marmot and other researchers, that status impacts health and therefore accounts for some of the social gradient in health, then it seems to be the case that it would be possible to bring about more equality in health by equalizing status. The purpose of this article is to analyze this suggestion. First, we suggest a working definition of what status precisely is. Second, following a luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice, we consider whether and to which extent individuals are responsible themselves for their position in a status hierarchy. Third, we consider the contours of a difficult question, namely which political measures are feasible in order to reduce health-affective inequalities in status and fourth, whether or to what extent such measures are legitimate. We argue that on the basis of these considerations, we have at least some prima facie reasons to counter (at least some) status inequalities in order to equalize health

Some theorists, worried about liberalism’s potential as a foundation for public health ethics, suggest that republicanism provides a better background of justification for public health policies, interventions, etc. In this article, this suggestion is put to the test, and it is argued that (i) contemporary (civic) republicanism and liberalism are not nearly as opposed as it is sometimes suggested, and that (ii) the kind of republicanism which one leading scholar in the field, Bruce Jennings, as an alternative to liberalism, does not reflect the contemporary understanding of republicanism as held by, e.g. Phillip Pettit et al