Existence monism (EM) is a metaphysical view asserting the existence of only one concrete object. EM is well known for its radicalness, and encounters difficulty in terms of its prima facie inconsistency with truisms. This paper aims to propose
an alternative (and somewhat easy) way to overcome this difficulty and indicate
another means by which the possibility of EM can be defended. I will present a
package of theses that are intended to be combined with EM, which I call Linguistic
Ontology…
Read moreExistence monism (EM) is a metaphysical view asserting the existence of only one concrete object. EM is well known for its radicalness, and encounters difficulty in terms of its prima facie inconsistency with truisms. This paper aims to propose
an alternative (and somewhat easy) way to overcome this difficulty and indicate
another means by which the possibility of EM can be defended. I will present a
package of theses that are intended to be combined with EM, which I call Linguistic
Ontology with the One as Semantic Glue (LOOSG). I will show that this
package (in combination with EM) provides a systematic explanation as to why
truisms hold while only one concrete object actually exists. In other words, I will
argue that if an existence monist embraces LOOSG, the desired explanation for
truisms is then available to her. In addition, it will also be noted that LOOSG has
a theoretical virtue, in that it only presupposes the framework of standard semantics.
Based on these discussions, I offer LOOSG as a viable option for existence
monism.
