•  684
  •  485
    There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers
    with Pierre Hadot and J. Aaron Simmons
    Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19 (3): 229-237. 2005.
  •  510
    Is Clarity Essential to Good Teaching?
    with Aaron M. Clark
    Teaching Philosophy 33 (3): 271-289. 2010.
    It is common to think that clarity is an essential ingredient of good teaching, meaning, in part, that good teachers always make it as easy as possible to follow what they say. We disagree. What we argue is that there are cases in which a philosophy teacher needs to forego clarity, making strategic use of obscurity in the undergraduate classroom.
  •  207
    Along with fresh interpretations of Plato, this book proposes a radically new approach to reading him, one that can teach us about protreptic, as it is called, by reimagining the ways in which Socrates engages in it. Protreptic, as it is conceived in the book, is an attempt to bring about a fundamental change of heart in people so that they want truth more than anything else. In taking the approach developed in this book, one doesn't try to get Plato right but simply uses his dialogues as a th…Read more
  •  1350
    Knowledge and Forms in Plato's Educational Philosophy
    Educational Theory 70 (2): 215-229. 2020.
    In this paper, I argue that Plato's views on Forms play a central role in his educational philosophy. In response to what certain commentators have recently written, I contend that this interpretation not only is accurate but also is advantageous because of how it can help philosophy of education. I also address the view, proposed by one philosopher of education, that Plato believes that the most valuable sort of knowledge cannot be fully expressed in words and that the objects of this knowled…Read more
  •  112
    The Role of Reason for Borden Parker Bowne
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 38 (4). 2002.
  • A Rhetorical Turn in Philosophical Counseling?
    with D. Kevin Sargent
    International Journal of Philosophical Practice 1 (2): 10-29. 2002.
    Far more than the dialectic philosophy of Socrates, the rhetorical humanist tradition avoids objectivist epistemology, charts a traversable path to practical wisdom, and aptly highlights the importance of aesthetic style. In those and other ways, we argue, it offers a preferable historical basis for today’s philosophical counseling. Advocates of that contemporary practice tend to cite Socrates as its historical progenitor and favor the narrow propositional logic that is ascribed to him. Some pra…Read more
  •  443
    Freedom through Critique: Thoreau's Service to Others
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (2). 2005.
  •  188
    The Republic's Ambiguous Democracy
    with Shane A. Bilsborough
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4): 301-316. 2010.
    Most scholars have thought that in the _Republic_ democracy is supposed to be worse than timarchy or oligarchy, but lately certain commentators have denied that it is. Is it, then? We argue that pursuing this question leads to a dead end: it simply is not clear how bad democracy is supposed to be in the _Republic_. To make our case, we first marshal the strongest available evidence that democracy is supposedly better than timarchy and oligarchy. Next we lay out the strongest available evide…Read more
  •  237
    The Possibility Requirement in Plato’s Republic
    Ancient Philosophy 28 (1): 71-85. 2008.
    The aristocratic city described in Plato's _Republic_ is a hypothetical city, as opposed to a city that exists. But in the _Republic_, Socrates and his interlocutors argue that this city is practicable, meaning, roughly, that it *could* exist. I contend that their argument for that claim is essential to their argument that the city is just. In other words, I maintain that the first argument has to succeed in order for the second argument to succeed: in order to show that the city is just, So…Read more
  •  392
    The Possibility Requirement in Plato’s Republic
    Ancient Philosophy 28 (1): 71-85. 2008.
    The aristocratic city described in Plato's _Republic_ is a hypothetical city, as opposed to a city that exists. But in the _Republic_, Socrates and his interlocutors argue that this city is practicable, meaning, roughly, that it *could* exist. I contend that their argument for that claim is essential to their argument that the city is just. In other words, I maintain that the first argument has to succeed in order for the second argument to succeed: in order to show that the city is just, Socrat…Read more
  •  11
    Democracy in Plato’s Republic: How Bad is it Supposed to Be?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1): 93-105. 2009.
  •  250
    Revisiting Gender-Inclusive God-Talk
    Philosophy and Theology 20 (1-2): 243-263. 2008.
    Though academic debate over gender-inclusive God-talk seems to have fizzled, the issue is a pressing one within many Christiandenominations today—both within and outside the Church—and for that reason deserves to be briefly revisited. Accordingly, althoughin this essay we approach the issue as professional philosophers, our focus is on the life of the Church—more specifically, those no doubt sizable segments of the Church for which a personal God and Satan exist and evangelism matters. Running a…Read more
  •  4
    Persons, Institutions, and Trust: Essays in Honor of Thomas O. Buford (edited book)
    with James Beauregard, James M. McLachlan, Richard Prust, J. Aaron Simmons, Nathan Riley, Randall Auxier, Thomas O. Buford, John Scott Gray, and Eugene Long
    Vernon Press. 2016.
    The papers presented in this volume honor Thomas O. Buford. Buford is Professor Emeritus in Philosophy at Furman University where he taught for over 40 years. Many of the papers in this volume are from former students. But Professor Buford is also a pre-eminent voice of forth generation Personalism, and Boston Personalism in particular. Personalism is a school of philosophical and theological thought which holds that the ideas of “person” and “personality” are indispensable both to an adequate u…Read more
  •  964
    Socrates' Defensible Devices in Plato's Meno
    Theory and Research in Education 17 (2): 165-180. 2019.
    Despite how revered Socrates is among many educators nowadays, he can seem in the end to be a poor model for them, particularly because of how often he refutes his interlocutors and poses leading questions. As critics have noted, refuting people can turn them away from inquiry instead of drawing them in, and being too directive with them can squelch independent thought. I contend, though, that Socrates' practices are more defensible than they often look: although there are risks in refuting p…Read more