•  1042
    Quo vadis, realisme?
 O obecnym stanie sporu o realizm naukowy
    Filozofia Nauki 26 (2 [102]): 151-164. 2018.
    The article investigates the intuition that both scientific realism and scientific antirealism are turning into degenerating research programs. The evolution of realism in reaction to pessimistic (meta)induction has certainly led to its increased sophistication as it has given rise to various versions of selective realism. However, many current discussions seem either too focused on semantic niceties or are turning into endless quarrels over case-study refutations of particular forms of realism.…Read more
  •  310
    Konwencjonalizm a realizm: Poincaré i Duhem wobec statusu poznawczego nauk przyrodniczych
    Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 99 (3): 103-118. 2016.
    W pierwszej połowie XX wieku przyjęło się upatrywać w poglądach H. Poincarégo i P. Duhema przykładów antyrealistycznego stanowiska odnośnie do nauki i jej teorii. Etykietka ta przylgnęła do tych autorów tak mocno, że coraz częstszym dzisiaj głosom tych, którzy sprzeciwiają się takiemu szufladkowaniu ich filozofii, trudno jest przebić się do głównego nurtu dyskusji filozoficznych. W artykule wskazuję, że odczytywanie poglądów obu francuskich autorów jako antyrealistycznych nie znajduje potwierdze…Read more
  •  203
    Nowa indukcja a nowy realizm
    Filo-Sofija 29 65-78. 2015.
    P. Kyle Stanford formulated his New Induction over the History of Science in order to show that underdetermination of scientific theories by evidence is a genuine problem of scientific theorizing about the world and a one that all scientific realists should take seriously. His argument uses historical record to show that because successful theories of the past were typically, in the light of the then available evidence, underdetermined by theories which we could not at the time conceive, we shou…Read more
  •  35
    Deconstructing the Phantom: Duhem and the Scientific Realism Debate
    with Krzysztof Szlachcic
    Foundations of Science 27 (4): 1453-1475. 2022.
    For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the so…Read more
  •  6
    Arguments from authority and critical thinking. Side notes toLogic and Argumentation by Andrzej KisielewiczThe article focuses on the role of arguments from authority — or, more precisely, arguments from expert opinion – in rational argumentation and reasoning, in the contemporary context of specialisation of the sciences on the one hand, and the abundance of information on the other. The pretext for this is provided by Andrzej Kisielewicz’s new book: Logika i argumentacja. Praktyczny kurs kryty…Read more
  •  1
    Wprowadzenie
    with Krzysztof Szlachcic
    Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 17 (3): 5. 2022.
  •  1
    Status wiedzy naukowej w filozofii konwencjonalistycznej
    In Damian Leszczyński (ed.), Studia systematica 3. Wiedza, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. pp. 203-219. 2013.
  • Analiza krytyczna koncepcji ewolucyjnego rozwoju nauki Stephena Toulmina
    Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia (4): 75-96. 2011.
    This paper discusses main issues concerning Toulmin’s theory of evolutionary development of scientific knowledge. The reconstruction of Toulmin’s assumptions, which underlie the theory, and the presentation of the theory itself, is followed by the analysis of the difficulties of the conception in general. The author tries to show that these difficulties consist primarily in the discrepancy between what Toulmin aimed at and what he actually achieved. The problem is that although incorporating the…Read more
  • Jak dowodzić realności przedmiotów teoretycznych
    Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 7 (4): 59-76. 2012.
  • O pesymistycznej indukcji
    Lectiones and Acroases Philosophicae (1): 131-148. 2013.