Mats Bergman

Complementing earlier efforts to scrutinize the uses of models in the field of media and communication studies, this volume reassesses old perspectives and delineates new theoretical options for communication inquiry. It is the first book to undertake a philosophical investigation of the significance of modelling in the study of the varying phenomena, processes, and practices of communication. By homing in on the manifestations and purposes of modelling in ordinary discourses on communication as well as in theoretical expositions, the essays collected in this book cast new light on the importance of models for communication inquiry. This volume challenges received view of communication models as mere diagrams and opens up new paths of conceptual inquiry in communication research.

In communication theory, the distinctive contribution of pragmatism is often construed in terms of providing a comprehensive orientation to inquiry. In this article, I argue that this appropriation, plausible as it is, has been partly hampered by a neglect of significant tensions between different pragmatist conceptions of inquiry, rooted in the philosophies of Peirce and Dewey. I identify a number of central commonalities and divergences between these viewpoints, focusing on the question of the aims of inquiry. The undeniable points of difference include core issues such as the significance of truth and the social-melioristic motives for inquiry. Yet, the article finds that the gaps between the pragmatists are not as wide and debilitating as they may at first appear; and a closer consideration of the implications of these fissures can actually be beneficial for the development of a more nuanced and robust pragmatist framework for social research. At the centre of this reconstruction is a minimal-meliorist conception of inquiry understood as habit-formation and habitmodification. I conclude the article with a brief review of the alleged critical deficit in pragmatism, and suggest some distinctive ways in which the classical pragmatists can contribute to critical communication inquiry.

T. L. Short's Peirce's Theory of Signs offers a strong interpretation of semeiotic, advocating a developmental and naturalistic position. This commentary examines some of the main features of Short's approach, raising a number of critical questions concerning the growth of Peirce's thought and the problem of anthropomorphism. First, two possible weaknesses in Short's account of the development of semeiotic, connected to the treatment of the "New List of Categories" and the role of the index, are noted. Next, the menace of anthropomorphism is placed in the context of Peirce's startling affirmation of this point of view. Finally, the article draws attention to Short's bold claim that Peirce's theory of signs needs to be modified in order to accommodate a plurality of final interpretants in view of varying purposes.

Of recent attempts to appropriate pragmatism for communication studies, Robert Craig’s inclusion of a pragmatist “tradition” in his influential “metamodel” of communication theoriesconstitutes one of the most prominent proposals to date. In this model, pragmatism is principally understood by contrast to other alternatives, such as phenomenology, semiotics, and rhetoric. As a communication-theoretical tradition in Craig’s sense, the pragmatist approach is expected to provide distinctive articulations of the nature of communication and communication problems, expressed in a particular vocabulary. Useful as such a partitioning may be for analytical and dialogical purposes, the delimitation of pragmatism that emerges from Craig’s efforts is in many respects problematic. After a summary of the background assumptions and disciplinary aims of Craig’s project, this article identifies three serious weaknesses in his account: its neglect of relevant intra-tradition distinctions and debates, its straightforward association of pragmatism with a strongly constitutive approach to communication, and its tendency to disconnect pragmatism from other communication-theoretical positions in ways that are not conducive to his objectives. This discussion highlights the contrast between Craig’s constructionist instrumentalism and the habit-realism of the classical pragmatisms of Peirce and Dewey.

Abstract1 This article examines Peirce's semiotic philosophy and its development in the light of his characterisations of "representationism" and "presentationism". In his definitions of these positions, Peirce overtly pits the representationists, who treat percepts as representatives, against the presentationists, according to whom percepts do not stand for hidden realities. The article shows that Peirce's early writings—in particular the essay "On the Doctrine of Immediate Perception" and certain key texts from the period 1868–9—advocate an inferentialist approach clearly associated with representationism. However, although Peirce continues to deny the cognitive import of first impressions throughout his philosophical career, the new view of perception that emerges in the early 1900s indicates a significant move in the direction of a presentationist point of view, a development partly corresponding to changes in his theory of categories. The strongest evidence for this reading is found in Peirce's contention that the percept is not a sign. The discussion concludes with considerations of possible objections and alternatives to the proposed interpretation in addition to some reflections on the consequences and relevance of Peirce's turn toward presentationism.

: T. L. Short's Peirce's Theory of Signs offers a strong interpretation of semeiotic, advocating a developmental and naturalistic position. This commentary examines some of the main features of Short's approach, raising a number of critical questions concerning the growth of Peirce's thought and the problem of anthropomorphism. First, two possible weaknesses in Short's account of the development of semeiotic, connected to the treatment of the "New List of Categories" and the role of the index, are noted. Next, the menace of anthropomorphism is placed in the context of Peirce's startling affirmation of this point of view. Finally, the article draws attention to Short's bold claim that Peirce's theory of signs needs to be modified in order to accommodate a plurality of final interpretants in view of varying purposes