Matt LaVine

In this dissertation, I develop a new theory for distinguishing between analytic and synthetic truths. Despite being a somewhat new combination of views, each individual view in the theory is firmly grounded in a number of earlier theories given throughout the Analytic tradition. For this reason, Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the theories of various Positivists and Wittgensteinians, Quine, and Kripke from a contemporary perspective. Chapter 2 provides an explication and evaluation of the work which began the contemporary discussion on the analytic/synthetic distinction, Paul Boghossian’s distinctions between epistemic/metaphysical analyticity and the analytic theories of the a priori/necessity. Chapter 3 introduces the work of the most important theorist of metaphysical analyticity, Gillian Russell. Here, I work toward a compromise between Boghossian and Russell which involves advocating for epistemic and metaphysical analyticity via a principle which connects implicit definitions and reference-determination. Given that I defend epistemic and metaphysical analyticity—and that Boghossian thinks a defense of epistemic analyticity yields a defense of the analytic theory of the a priori—Chapter 4 turns to a discussion of the analytic theory of necessity. Here, I argue that Russell’s basic problem for the analytic theory of necessity is the most troubling for the proponent of this view, but that there are still potential avenues open for solving it. Finally, in Chapter 5, I bring the earlier chapters together to try to show that, while they do not directly argue for a traditional theory of analyticity, they do undermine various arguments against such a theory.

In this article, we advocate for a particular form of environmental radicalism that realizes a revolution in ways of thinking, knowing, and acting in human relationships with ourselves, with others—in multiple senses of the that term—and with the earth. In this endeavor, we join many environmental researchers and activists in calling for a fundamental shift in the terms and enactment of the human relationship to the planet and its natural systems. However, we are convinced that to be successful in halting and remediating our present destructive environmental conditions, environmental radicalism must also incorporate a significant, nontrivial paradigmatic shift in human self-development, in human social structures, and in our epistemological foundations for these structures. In this regard, we understand environmental radicalism as both theory and action, equally philosophy and practice. We begin by identifying environmental radicalism as a species of both philosophy and action within the genus of radicalism and with a direct, specific relationship to the idea of revolution. To be an environmental radical within our usage, one must advocate for a revolution in relationships between humans and our environments, both at the level of thought and behavior. We further explain our concept of revolution throughout this article. Elsewhere we have written about the necessity for redefining revolution, “not as destruction but as the necessary collapse, reorganization, and creation cycle, foundational to the overall resilience of social ecological systems.” Perhaps more substantively, we hold that such a revolution must understand that our need for radicalism comes from the existence of a white supremacist system of intranational and international power, devastation, and destruction. Thus, to be an environmental radical one must also advocate for a revolt against white supremacy, which will allow opportunity for the needed changes in human interactions with natural systems.

Alexis Alleyne-Caputo has a vision of what’s possible that we badly need in our white supremacist, patriarchal, capitalistic, colonial world. Brought together by years of lived experience and work as an interdisciplinary artist, anthropologist, educator, and researcher—it’s a vision of resistance, a vision of light, a vision of empowerment, a vision of collective consciousness. Hers is a way of focusing—an awareness—a recognition of possibilities for minds, bodies, and hearts to come together in new and uplifting ways that goes beyond the visual through Caputo’s unique ability to use one sensory input to stimulate another cognitive pathway.

Conflict is inevitable in the workplace and manifests in different ways. It is a common dysfunction when working in teams. A diversity of thoughts, ideologies, and beliefs always creates a risk of disagreement and misalignment. When examining identity and positionality in the workplace, conflict is usually resolved in favor of those who have identities within the dominant White culture. In light of this common reality, an opportunity is created to examine and determine how conflict can be resolved from an inclusive and equitable approach. This case study is designed to outline the tools and resources the Center for Equity and Inclusion uses with its clients when guiding organizations to resolve conflict, advance equity, and center Black, Indigenous, People of Color (BIPOC) in the workplace.

Arthur Prior’s argument for the A-theory of time in “Thank Goodness That’s Over” is perhaps his most famous and well-known non-logical work. Still, I think that this paper is one of his most misunderstood works. Because of this, much of its brilliance has yet to be properly appreciated. In this paper, I suggest that the explanation of this is that it has been treated as though it were following the standard model for a piece of Analytic philosophy. That is, it has been assumed that what Prior was doing was deductively demonstrating the truth of a proposition which can be discussed via any sentences with the same semantic content. Here, I argue that this assumption is wrong on two fronts: Most importantly, the strongest reading of the structure of Prior’s argument is as an abduction rather than as a deduction. Many of the most important lessons of the argument are lost by focusing on the bare propositional content of its premise and conclusion statements. In other words, we can learn as much from the manner in which this argument is presented and expressed as we can from that which is expressed.

Increasingly, philosophy is being viewed by the public as a non-essential part of non-academic, political life. Moreover, the converse, that philosophy is viewing itself as non-essential to life, is also becoming true. Both trends are deeply troubling. This essay has two aims, both of which stem from these trends. The first is to show that they can partly be explained by a misunderstanding by philosophers of philosophy’s original goals. In fact, we argue that the goal of philosophy from the very beginning was to improve lives and that this attitude has been present throughout its history. The second is to show that this mistake is pervasive and to try to articulate some of what has been lost as a result. So as to not be entirely negative, we provide brief remarks on what can be done to remedy the situation. We hold that generally, people’s lives and especially people’s political lives are worse than they otherwise might be because of the disconnect between the public and philosophy. Finally, we close with a few practical activities that some philosophers are already engaged in to make work in philosophy more public.