•  1120
    The Erotetic Theory of Delusional Thinking
    Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 20 (5): 398-415. 2015.
  •  411
    Expressing first-person authority
    Philosophical Studies 172 (8): 2215-2237. 2015.
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a n…Read more
  •  292
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott, we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than to…Read more
  •  211
    Epicurean aspects of mental state attributions
    with Anil Gomes
    Philosophical Psychology 28 (7): 1001-1011. 2015.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people judge patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mental capacity than the dead. They explain this result by claiming that people have implicit dualist or afterlife beliefs. This essay critically evaluates their experimental findings and their proposed explanation. We argue first that the experiments do not support the conclusion that people intuitively think PVS patients have l…Read more
  •  187
    Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1). 2014.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, mor…Read more
  •  97
    The Look of Another Mind
    Mind 126 (504): 1023-1061. 2017.
    According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an apple and argue that this…Read more
  •  42
    Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion
    Mind and Language 32 (1): 39-64. 2017.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specif…Read more
  •  33
    Self-Blindness and Self-Knowledge
    Philosophers' Imprint 17. 2017.
    Many philosophers hold constitutive theories of self-knowledge in the sense that they think either that a person’s psychological states depend upon her having true beliefs about them, or that a person’s believing that she is in a particular psychological state depends upon her actually being in that state. One way to support this type of view can be found in Shoemaker’s well-known argument that an absurd condition, which he calls “self-blindness”, would be possible if a subject’s psychological s…Read more
  •  33
    Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1): 271-296. 2016.
    The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, mor…Read more
  •  24
    Delusional Predictions and Explanations
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
    In both cognitive science and philosophy, many theorists have recently appealed to a predictive processing framework to offer explanations of why certain individuals form delusional beliefs. One aim of this essay will be to illustrate how one could plausibly develop a predictive processing account in different ways to account for the onset of different kinds of delusions. However, the second aim of this essay will be to discuss two significant limitations of the predictive processing framework. …Read more
  •  11
    Explaining Inserted Thoughts
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3): 239-242. 2015.
    It seems to be impossible for a person to have introspective access to thoughts that are not her own. Yet, although first-personal conscious awareness of a particular thought is normally sufficient for being its owner, some schizophrenic subjects report being conscious of thoughts that are not theirs. This suggests that, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, thought ownership is not a necessary condition for consciously experiencing a thought. Because what schizophrenics report is thus rather dif…Read more
  •  1
    Knowing Other Minds (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2019.
    How do we acquire knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others? Knowing Other Minds brings together ten original essays that address various questions in philosophy and in empirical cognitive science which arise from our everyday social interaction with other people.
  • Volume on the problem of other minds (edited book)
    with Anita Avramides
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.