•  203
    Am I You?
    Philosophical Explorations 17 (3): 358-371. 2014.
    It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and the non-reflexive us…Read more
  •  114
    The Laws of Thought and the Power of Thinking
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1): 249-297. 2009.
  •  81
    For Oneself and Toward Another: The Puzzle about Recognition
    Philosophical Topics 42 (1): 113-152. 2014.
    The paper is devoted to a certain way of thinking of the action of another. The posture of mind is characteristically expressed by a specific use of what G. E. M. Anscombe calls stopping modals. On this use, the sentence, “You can’t do that; it is mine,” registers the necessity of justice. My question is: what is the relation between the status of a person, a bearer of rights, the recognition of others as persons, and the practice of addressing the demands of justice to one another? According to…Read more
  •  76
    Drei Formen der Ersten Person Plural
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (2): 225-243. 2007.
    Stanley Cavell vertritt die These, dass man nur verstehen kann, was eine Sprache ist, wenn man die Grammatik der Aussagen untersucht, mit der Muttersprachler ihre Sprache artikulieren: Es sind Aussagen in der Ersten Person Plural, die kein Beobachtungswissen, sondern eine Form von Selbstbewusstsein zum Ausdruck bringen. Während Cavells These, das Wesen von Sprache zeige sich in der Grammatik jener Aussagen, eine tiefe Einsicht darstellt, ist seine Analyse ihrer Form verfehlt. Cavell verwechselt …Read more
  •  71
    Knowing what I have done
    Manuscrito 41 (4): 195-253. 2018.
    The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowled…Read more
  •  45
    Semantik ohne Wahrheit
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (3): 449-466. 2006.
    Der Gegenstand des Interviews mit Robert Brandom ist die Entwicklung seiner Theorie begrifflichen Gehalts ausgehend von „Expressive Vernunft“ bis zu den kürzlich gehaltenen Locke-Lectures und dem sich in Arbeit befindenden Buch über Hegel. Im Zentrum stehen folgende Fragen: Kann eine Bedeutungstheorie, wie sie Brandom vorschlägt, ohne den Begriff der Wahrheit auskommen und sich auf modale und normative Begriffe beschränken? Wie erfolgreich ist Brandoms Versuch, mithilfe des Begriffs der pragmati…Read more
  •  36
  •  26
    Die Wirklichkeit meiner Tat
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (3): 419-433. 2013.
    The power to act intentionally is a power to change the world. It differs from other powers to affect change in that the change is of a particular kind. It is a change through thought. Paradigmatically, it begins with the negation of what is as not as it is to be and the setting of an action concept as to be realized. The pursuit of the end is the realizing of the concept. If all goes well, the process culminates in my knowledge that my deed is done. The power to act is, in this sense, the power…Read more
  •  18
    Practically Self-Conscious Life
    In Micah Lott (ed.), Philippa Foot on Goodness and Virtue, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 85-126. 2018.
    Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism suggests that the sense of normative terms like “ought” and “good” as they appear in ethical discourse is to be elucidated in terms of the relation in which a living individual stands to the life-form or “species” of which it is an exemplar—in our case: the human life-form. A theory of this form has to provide a story about questions such as: What enables us to distinguish the different kinds of life within the theory? What makes them, despite those difference…Read more