• Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments (edited book)
    Routledge. forthcoming.
    It seems plausible that there can be “no win” moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmatic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? A team of top epistemologists address these and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. Anyon…Read more
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    This book offers a systematic and up-to-date account of the landscape of contemporary epistemology. It presupposes only a minimum of prior philosophical knowledge, and includes an account of the logical and conceptual tools needed for philosophical analysis. Focuses on the writings and ideas of W. Alston, R. Audi, L. BonJour, R. Chisholm, A. Goldman. H. Kornboith, K. Lehrer. A. Plantinga, W. V. Quine, E. Sosa, and B Stroud, among others; links particular theories and arguments to their chief pro…Read more
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    A collection of vigorous debates on some of the most controversial topics in recent theoretical epistemology.
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    According to externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism, it's possible to gain knowledge through a perceptual experience without being in a position to know that the experience is reliable. As a result, both of these views face the problem of making knowledge of perceptual reliability too easy, for they permit deducing perceptual reliability from particular perceptual experience without already knowing that these experiences are trustworthy. Ernest Sosa advocates a two-stage solution t…Read more
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    Harmless naturalism: The limits of science and the nature of philosophy
    Philosophical Review 109 (3): 462-465. 2000.
    Should we only believe what science can prove? Robert Almeder analyzes "naturalized epistemology," which holds that the only valid claims that can be made about the world must be proven by the natural sciences and that all philosophical questions are ultimately answered by science. The author examines and refutes different forms of naturalized epistemology before settling on "harmless naturalism," a compromise which implies that certain questions about the world are answerable and have been answ…Read more
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    In recent years, what is commonly referred to as “virtue epistemology” has gained momentum. One of the first to champion this approach with much force and sophistication was Ernest Sosa. James Montmarquet has contributed to the ascendancy of virtue epistemology with a fine monograph, and Alvin Goldman has, at least indirectly, confirmed the attraction of this approach by rephrasing his latest version of reliabilism in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. In Virtues of the Mind, Linda Zagzebski …Read more
  • Benign Infinity
    In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. pp. 235-57. 2019.
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    Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4): 611-618. 2018.
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    Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 228-232. 1992.
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    A Companion to Epistemology (edited book)
    with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1992.
    Epistemology - the theory of knowledge and of justified belief - has always been of central importance in philosophy. Progress in other areas of philosophical research has often depended crucially on epistemological presuppositions. This Companion, with well over 250 articles ranging from summary discussions to major essays on topics of current controversy, is the first complete reference work devoted to the subject. All the main theoretical positions in epistemology are discussed and analysed, …Read more
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    Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga’s Proper Functioning Theory (review)
    with Alvin Plantinga
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 409. 1995.
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    Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (4): 856. 1992.
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    Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (edited book)
    with Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.
    Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an acce…Read more
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    A companion to epistemology, second edition (edited book)
    with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
    Blackwell. 2010.
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    Epistemology’s Paradox: Is a Theory of Knowledge Possible? (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2): 118-120. 1995.
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    Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology
    Acta Analytica 15 (1): 25-56. 2000.
    Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal …Read more
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    Believing intentionally
    Synthese 194 (8): 2673-2694. 2017.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, an…Read more
  •  52
    Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1): 75-98. 2000.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of t…Read more
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    The analysis of knowledge
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
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    Internalist reliabilism
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
    When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call thi…Read more
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    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justifi…Read more
  • Radu J. Bogdan, ed., Profiles: Roderick M. Chisholm (review)
    Philosophy in Review 7 435-437. 1987.
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    A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sen…Read more