Matus Porubjak

Štúdia sa zameriava na psychologické a didaktické metódy použité v Platónovom dialógu Menón. S využitím metódy dramatického čítania dialógu autor analyzuje dve kľúčové časti sokratovskej pedagogiky: negatívnu (aporetickú) charakterizovanú elenchom s cieľom nájsť a eliminovať chybné predpoklady, a pozitívnu (euporetickú), ktorej cieľom je pomôcť študentovi nájsť nové riešenia a prostredníctvom argumentácie ho priviesť k lepšiemu porozumeniu problému. V závere autor uvádza, že hlavným cieľom dialógu Menón je ukázať rozdiel medzi „sofistickým“ a „sókratovským“ spôsobom učenia. Zatiaľ čo prvý spočíva v memorovaní autoritatívnych názorov a poznatkov učiteľa, sókratovský je založený na spoločnom hľadaní lepších argumentov. Takáto metóda vedie k lepšiemu porozumeniu v oboch významoch tohto slova – v sociálnom (schopnosť sebaovládania a spolupráce), ako aj poznávacom (schopnosť chápať veci v súvislostiach a otvorenosť k ďalšiemu skúmaniu).

Štúdia sa zameriava na psychologické a didaktické metódy použité v Platónovom dialógu Menón. S využitím metódy dramatického čítania dialógu autor analyzuje dve kľúčové časti sokratovskej pedagogiky: negatívnu (aporetickú) charakterizovanú elenchom s cieľom nájsť a eliminovať chybné predpoklady, a pozitívnu (euporetickú), ktorej cieľom je pomôcť študentovi nájsť nové riešenia a prostredníctvom argumentácie ho priviesť k lepšiemu porozumeniu problému. V závere autor uvádza, že hlavným cieľom dialógu Menón je ukázať rozdiel medzi „sofistickým“ a „sókratovským“ spôsobom učenia. Zatiaľ čo prvý spočíva v memorovaní autoritatívnych názorov a poznatkov učiteľa, sókratovský je založený na spoločnom hľadaní lepších argumentov. Takáto metóda vedie k lepšiemu porozumeniu v oboch významoch tohto slova – v sociálnom (schopnosť sebaovládania a spolupráce), ako aj poznávacom (schopnosť chápať veci v súvislostiach a otvorenosť k ďalšiemu skúmaniu).

The paper deals with the so-called “Theognidean dilemma” in Plato’s Meno. The author tries to answer the question, if aretê is a matter of teaching or a natural human endowment from the view point of the Theognidea collection. First, he tries to identify both the ‘eugenic’ and the ‘didactic’ tendencies of the Theognidea and compare them. Then, he turns to the role of Kyrnos’ character in the collection. The author concludes that neither Kyrnos nor Theognis are historical personalities per se; primarily they are models, like the characters of Socratic dialogues. On the one hand, we have the moderate Theognis, the poet, master and erômenos with a sense of measure and justice, and on the other hand the erratic Kyrnos, the handsome and gifted erastês with a tendency to intemperance and hubris. Like Kyrnos, Meno in Plato’s dialogue is able to improve his skills and became moderate, but eventually, he fails in life. By choosing Theognis, Plato seems to reflect this similarity. From the viewpoint of the Theognidea, there is no contradiction in the verses quoted by Socrates in Meno. The position seems to be clear and “eugenic” in principle. Low-borns will never become good, but good high-borns often fail. The riddle of high-born failure is present in the works of many authors of the 5th and 4th centuries. All they are asking is how those who are destined to rule and be ex-cellent by birth and education can fail so much, as well as how society can be saved from ‘bastardization’. This issue links the Theognidea with Meno, and the quoted verses beautifully fit the topic of the dialogue.

This article reconsiders the significance of Theognis’ verses quoted in Plato’s Meno by examining the proposed dilemma in the Theognidea. Firstly, the structure of the dialogue, location of verses, and the dilemma itself are briefly discussed. The article then analyses Theognis’ ‘eugenic’ and ‘didactic’ positions, and suggests that there is no contradiction in the verses from the Theognidea quoted in the Meno, and that Plato was aware of this. The article finally concludes that the pictures of Socrates in Meno and Theognis in the Theognidea are alike in four important aspects: both are sôphrôn, both are personal exponents of dikê by virtue of their life, both are moral heroes striving for the improvement of others, and the result of their efforts has a tragic undertone. By drawing attention to tensions within the Theognidea, Plato may also draw readers’ attention to parallels between Theognis and Socrates as teachers.

This paper continues in the propagation of the ethical views of Theognis. In the first chapter is discussed the meaning of the word aidōs, which can be grasped as “Respect–for–Others”, and also as a human ability for proper understanding and for acting towards a human community, and towards Gods. The next chapter shows some new moments yielded by Theognis and by archaic lyricists in the understanding of relationships between men and Gods. The last chapter try to shows the interpretation of “mean way” by Theognis, and to outline his influence upon the later moral philosophy.

Prvými svedkami a neraz aj intelektuálnymi generátormi procesov, ktoré viedli k ustanoveniu sociálno-politických štruktúr klasických gréckych poleis, sú archaickí ly­rici. Medzi najstarších patrí spartský Tyrtaios (1. pol. 7. st. p. n. l.), ktorý vo svojej elégii (zl. 12) ustanovuje za vrcholnú zdatnosť thúridos alké (zúrivú chrabrosť, rázny odpor). Toto slovné spojenie nachádzame už u Homéra, ktorý ním pomenúva jednu z bojov­níckych aretai. Naším cieľom bude komplexne analyzovať 12. zlomok, preskúmať použitie tohto slovného spojenia u oboch básnikov a odhaliť nový kontext, do ktorého ho zasadzuje Tyrtaios. Pokúsime sa tak postihnúť jeden z počiatkov „nového racionálno-politického poriadku“ a ukázať spôsob, akým lyrika transformuje staré epické hodnoty na nové politické.

The aim of this article is to show a social role of friendship (filia) in Classical Greece and to discover why, as Aristotle thinks, is filia the greatest good for the polis. The author bases his analysis on a comparison between Plato’s dialogue Lysis and Aristotle’s Politics (namely the book 1 and book 3). He distinguishes four types of filia, and shows the social role played by each one of them: the love of parents to children, the friendship between teenage boys of the same age, the love of elder men to boys, and the friendship between free adult citizens.

The main goal of the paper is to rethink several aspects of the so-called Plato’s Theory of Recollection and to contribute to the discussion of the differences between the historical Socrates and Socrates in Plato. The author’s argumentation draws upon his own interpretation of Plato’s Meno. As far as the recollection is concerned his conclusion is that we should distinguish between: a) the recollection as a myth, playing an „anti-misologic“ and „protreptic“ roles in the dialogue, which should help us not to give up further researches; b) the recollection itself, which occupies the place between maieutic art of Socratic midwifery and Plato’s dialectic and which should help us to approach our experience critically, to find the solutions of particular problems, and to set off as true those solutions, which, being the subject of enquiry, proved to be sufficiently coherent