•  2738
    Published in the American Journal of Bioethics
  •  616
    LGBT testimony and the limits of trust
    Journal of Medical Ethics (x): 200-201. 2021.
    Draft of forthcoming article in the Journal of Medical Ethics where I discuss ethical tension between LGBT testimony and testimonial trust of medical professionals.
  •  467
    Autonomy-Centered Healthcare
    HEC Forum 30 (3): 297-318. 2018.
    In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that the consequences of the current United States health insurance scheme on both physician and patient autonomy is dire. So dire, in fact, that the only moral solution is something other than what we have now. The United States healthcare system faces much criticism at present. But my focus is particular: I am interested in the ways in which insurance interferes with physician and patient autonomy. I will argue in favor of an expansion of the traditional con…Read more
  •  360
    In this chapter I argue that Alexis de Tocqueville describes the virtue of citizenship in a way that is relevant to contemporary virtue ethics. He explains how a group can possess a virtue that is distinct from the virtue of individual members of the group. (this is an unofficial draft)
  •  252
    Berry, Daniels, and Ladin make a strong argument for discontinuing the use of, “lack of social support,” as an organ transplantation listing criterion. This argument, however, actually leads to conclusions much stronger than those that the authors’ propose: The argument works equally well against using, (1) any “psychosocial” factors at all as a listing criterion, and, (2) any criteria other than factors that directly relate to empirically established medical need, and/or empirically established…Read more
  •  223
    Reasonable Regret
    In Anna Gotlib & Mark Alfano (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Regret, . forthcoming.
  •  107
    Blame After Forgiveness
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3): 619-633. 2016.
    When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justif…Read more
  •  107
    Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4. 2017.
  •  71
    Inferior Disagreement
    Acta Analytica 31 (3): 263-283. 2016.
    Literature in the epistemology of disagreement has focused on peer disagreement: disagreement between those with shared evidence and equal cognitive abilities. Additional literature focuses on the perspective of amateurs who disagree with experts. However, the appropriate epistemic reaction from superiors who disagree with inferiors remains underexplored. Prima facie, this may seem an uninteresting set of affairs. If A is B’s superior, and A has good reason to believe she is B’s superior, A appe…Read more
  •  57
    Party Politics and Democratic Disagreement
    Philosophia 42 (1): 1-13. 2014.
    Political parties seem inclined to dogmatism. Understanding party politics via a plural-subject account of collective belief explains this phenomenon. It explains inter-party outrage at slight deviations from the party line and dogged refusals to compromise. It also aligns with an alternative theory of political representation. I argue that party dogmatism is unlikely to change and can be a democratic good. I conclude that not parties but patriots counteract the democratic ills of dogmatic party…Read more
  •  41
    Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page W10-W15.
  •  37
    Lotteries, Possible Worlds, and Probability
    Erkenntnis 87 (5): 2097-2118. 2022.
    A necessary criterion of Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology is his safety condition. A believer cannot know p unless her belief is safe. Her belief is safe only if p could not have easily been false. But “easily” is not to be understood probabilistically. The chance that p is false might be extremely low and yet p remains unsafe. This is what happens, Pritchard argues, in lottery examples and explains why knowledge is not a function of the probabilistic strength of one’s evidence. …Read more
  •  34
    Risk Sensitive Credit
    Erkenntnis 84 (3): 703-726. 2019.
    Credit theorists claim to explain the incompatibility of luck and knowledge and also what makes knowledge valuable. If the theory works as well as they think, it accomplishes a lot. Unsurprisingly, however, some epistemologists remain unsure. Jennifer Lackey, for instance, proposes a dilemma that suggests credit theories are either too strong or too weak. Her criticism has been hard to overcome. This paper suggests a modified account of knowledge as credit for true belief that allows credit theo…Read more
  •  28
    Are Obese Children Abused Children?
    Hastings Center Report 48 (4): 31-41. 2018.
    In 2010, a South Carolina mother was taken to court when her fourteen‐year‐old son reached 555 pounds. An article on the story reported, “His mother, Jerri Gray, lost custody of her son and is being charged with criminal neglect. Gray is facing 15 years on two felony counts, the first U.S. felony case involving childhood obesity.” If the caretakers of obese children are negligent, then they are also morally and legally blameworthy. I want to suggest, however, that important ethical differences e…Read more
  •  15
    Why Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology has No Luck with Closure
    Logos and Episteme 8 (4): 493-515. 2017.
    In Part I, this paper argues that Duncan Pritchard’s version of safety is incompatible with closure. In Part II I argue for an alternative theory that fares much better. Part I begins by reviewing past arguments concerning safety’s problems with closure. After discussing both their inadequacies and Pritchard’s response to them, I offer a modified criticism immune to previous shortcomings. I conclude Part I by explaining how Pritchard’s own arguments make my critique possible. Part II argues that…Read more
  • How Vice Can Motivate Distrust in Elites and Trust in Fake News
    In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press. 2021.