•  139
    Claudia Bianchi defends what she calls ‘MacKinnon's claim’: that ‘works of pornography can be understood as illocutionary acts of subordinating women, or illocutionary acts of silencing women’ in response to Saul , and by appeal to the formulations of Langton , Hornsby and Hornsby and Langton . I think Bianchi has two different claims in mind , and that it is important to distinguish the two, since the argument offered for either claim frustrates the aim sought by the other.Bianchi expresses the…Read more
  •  106
    Utterance of a sentence in poetry can be performative, and explicitly so. The best-known of Geoffrey Hill’s critical essays denies this, but his own poetry demonstrates it. I clarify these claims and explain why they matter. What Hill denies illuminates anxieties about responsibility and commitment that poets and critics share with philosophers. What Hill demonstrates affords opportunities for mutual benefit between philosophy and criticism.
  •  101
    Self-knowing agents • by Lucy O'Brien
    Analysis 69 (1): 187-188. 2009.
    How is it that we think and refer in the first-person way? For most philosophers in the analytic tradition, the problem is essentially this: how two apparently conflicting kinds of properties can be reconciled and united as properties of the same entity. What is special about the first person has to be reconciled with what is ordinary about it . The range of responses reduces to four basic options. The orthodox view is optimistic: there really is a way of reconciling these apparently contradicto…Read more
  •  90
    How Not To Do Things With Words: J. L. Austin on Poetry: Articles
    British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (1): 31-49. 2011.
    If philosophy and poetry are to illuminate each other, we should first understand their tendencies to mutual antipathy. Examining mutual misapprehension is part of this task. J. L. Austin's remarks on poetry offer one such point of entry: they are often cited by poets and critics as an example of philosophy's blindness to poetry. These remarks are complex and their purpose obscure—more so than those who take exception to them usually allow or admit. But it is reasonable to think that, for all hi…Read more
  •  69
    What is at stake when J. L. Austin calls poetry ‘non‐serious’, and sidelines it in his speech act theory?. Standard explanations polarize sharply along party lines: poets and critics are incensed, while philosophers deny cause. Neither line is consistent with Austin's remarks, whose allusions to Plato, Aristotle and Frege are insufficiently noted. What Austin thinks is at stake is confusion, which he corrects apparently to the advantage of poets. But what is actually at stake is the possibility …Read more
  •  67
    What is at stake when J. L. Austin calls poetry ‘non-serious’, and sidelines it in his speech act theory?. Standard explanations polarize sharply along party lines: poets and critics are incensed, while philosophers deny cause. Neither line is consistent with Austin's remarks, whose allusions to Plato, Aristotle and Frege are insufficiently noted. What Austin thinks is at stake is confusion, which he corrects apparently to the advantage of poets. But what is actually at stake is the possibility …Read more
  •  55
    Speech acts, responsibility and commitment in poetry
    In Peter Robinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary British and Irish Poetry, . pp. 617-637. 2013.
    Philosophy has tended to regard poetry primarily in terms of truth and falsity, assuming that its business is to state or describe states of affairs. Speech act theory transforms philosophical debate by regarding poetry in terms of action, showing that its business is primarily to do things. The proposal can sharpen our understanding of types of poetry; examples of the ‘Chaucer-Type’ and its variants demonstrate this. Objections to the proposal can be divided into those that relate to the agent …Read more
  •  54
    Integrity Over Time
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1): 50-72. 2012.
  •  52
    What are we? A study in personal ontology – Eric T. Olson
    Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238): 208-211. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  46
    On Referring to Oneself
    Theoria 70 (2-3): 121-161. 2004.
  •  45
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  44
    I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. The book thus not only resolves a key issue in philosophy of language, but promises to be of great use to people working on problems in other areas of philosophy.
  •  39
    Spinning threads: On Peacocke's moderate rationalism
    Philosophical Books 47 (2): 111-119. 2006.
  •  35
    Agents and Their Actions (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2011.
    Reflecting a recent flourishing of creative thinking in the field, _Agents and Their Actions_ presents seven newly commissioned essays by leading international philosophers that highlight the most recent debates in the philosophy of action Features seven internationally significant authors, including new work by two of philosophy's ‘super stars’, John McDowell and Joseph Raz Presents the first clear indication of how John McDowell is extending his path-breaking work on intentionality and percept…Read more
  •  32
    Is I Guaranteed to Refer?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2): 109-126. 2003.
    One claim about I, regularly made and almost universally endorsed, is that uses of the term are logically guaranteed to refer successfully. The claim is only rarely formulated perspicuously or argued for. Such obscurity helps disguise the fact that those who profess to advance the claim actually turn out to support not a logical guarantee at all but merely high security through fortunate coincidence. This is not surprising. For we have no good reason to accept the claim – granted, any use of I i…Read more
  •  32
    Thucydides of the cool hour
    Ratio 21 (3): 360-367. 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  31
    Wittgenstein on I and the self
    In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, . 2017.
    Consensus identifies an underlying continuity to Wittgenstein's treatment of the self and 'I', despite certain obvious surface variations and revisions. Almost all Wittgenstein's arguments and observations concerning 'I' and the self in the Tractatus are arranged as attempts to explicate. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world, not a part of it. The picture that…Read more
  •  27
    John Mcdowell
    Polity. 2004.
    John McDowell has set the philosophical world alight with a revolutionary approach to the subject, illuminating old problems with dazzling particularity. In this welcome introduction to his work, Maximilian de Gaynesford puts writing within comfortable reach of non-specialists. The guiding argument of the book is that the variety of McDowell's interests disguises a core concern with a single basic goal: 'giving philosophy peace'. Since the dawn of the subject, philosophy has struggled with the q…Read more
  •  24
    Ethics at the Cinema
    Philosophical Papers 42 (3). 2013.
    No abstract
  •  22
    This paper argues that Henry James’ treatment of balancing in The Golden Bowl—to which Putnam insightfully draws attention—calls for the attunement of philosophy and literary criticism. The process may undermine Putnam’s own reading of the novel, but it also finds new reasons to endorse what his reading was meant to deliver: the confidence that philosophy and thoughtful appreciation of literature have much to contribute to each other, and the conviction that morality can incorporate seriousness …Read more
  •  22
    Speech acts and poetry
    Analysis 70 (4). 2010.
  •  20
  •  20
    Naturalist Semantics and the Appeal to Structure
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1): 57-74. 2006.
    We need not accommodate facts about meaning if Quine is right about the indeterminacy of subsentential expressions; there can be no such facts to accommodate. Evans argued that Quine’s approach overlooks the ways speakers use predication to endow their use of subsentential expressions with the necessary determinacy. This paper offers a critical assessment of the debate in relation to current arguments about naturalism and shows how Evans’s response depends on a basic claim that turns out to be f…Read more
  •  18
    This paper draws attention to the fact that works of philosophy are often judged by aesthetic criteria. This raises the question of whether philosophical writings may properly be regarded as suitable objects of aesthetic judgement in a strong sense; namely, that judging their worth qua works of philosophy is an aesthetic endeavour. The paper argues in the affirmative with the aid of a Kantian account of aesthetic judgement. Judging a work of philosophy by the means chosen may be regarded as subj…Read more
  •  16
    How Wrong Can One Be?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 387-394. 1996.