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128A defense of the very idea of moral deference pessimismPhilosophical Studies (8): 2323-2340. 2020.Pessimists think that there is something wrong with relying on deference for one’s moral beliefs—at least if one is morally mature. Call this no deference. They also tend to think that what explains our aversion to cases of moral deference is the fact that they involve deference about moral claims. Call this moral explanation. Recently, both no deference and moral explanation have come under attack. Against no deference, some philosophers offer purported counterexamples involving moral advice. I…Read more
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96The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simpleSynthese 199 (5-6): 12963-12984. 2021.The simple knowledge norm of assertion holds that one may assert that p only if one knows that p. Turri :37–45, 2011) and Williamson both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express knowledge norm of assertion. I defend SKNA and argue against EKNA. First, I argue that EKNA faces counterexamples. Second, I argue that EKNA assumes an implausible view of …Read more
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75The New Puzzle of Moral DeferenceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4): 460-476. 2020.Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements. First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods should be off-putting. Second, I argue that moral deference is sometimes superior to these other methods because it puts one in a better position to gain th…Read more
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57Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and PragmaticsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1): 5-22. 2020.In this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral assertions made solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs violate a plausible epistemic and moral norm against withholding information that one knows, has evidence, or ought to believe will impor…Read more
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32The Norm of Moral Assertion: A Reply to SimionEthical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4): 1043-1049. 2019.Mona Simion has recently argued for a function-first norm of moral assertion. According to function-first accounts, the norm of any kind of assertion is determined by the function of that kind of assertion. She argues that, on the assumption that moral understanding is the goal of moral inquiry, the function of moral assertion is reliably generating moral understanding in others and that the norm of moral assertion should fall out of that function. In particular, she thinks the norm should be su…Read more
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31On Gratitude to NatureJournal of Applied Philosophy 40 (2): 321-339. 2023.In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest the right kind of goodwill or care toward one. In …Read more
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University of HelsinkiPost-doctoral fellow
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Helsinki, Southern Finland, Finland
Areas of Specialization
Moral Psychology |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Environmental Ethics |
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |