Mehul "Stretch" Shah Shah

This paper will show how the three principles of the Socratic teaching method—midwifery, recollection, and cross-examination—are utilized in the treatment of learning diseases, that is, attitudes that interfere with effective learning. The Socratic teaching method differs from the traditional lecture model of teaching, but it does not sacrifice the therapeutic for the informative task of teaching. Rather, by indirectly imparting content and uncovering implicit content through careful questioning, it provides a careful balance between the informative and therapeutic aspects of teaching. Insights from client-centered and cognitive therapy can enhance the effectiveness of the Socratic teaching method.

Popper is well known for rejecting a logic of discovery, but he is only justified in rejecting the same type of logic of discovery that is denied by consequentialism. His own account of hypothesis generation, based on a natural selection analogy, involves an error-eliminative logic of discovery and the differences he admits between biological and conceptual evolution suggest an error-corrective logic of discovery. These types of logics of discovery are based on principles of plausibility that are used in the generation as opposed to the preliminary evaluation of hypotheses. The normative relevance of these principles is grounded in the distinction between strategic and definitory rules.

In his influential paper, 'Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?', Laudan contends that there has been no philosophical rationale for a logic of discovery since the emergence of consequentialism in the 19th century. It is the purpose of this paper to show that consequentialism does not involve the rejection of all types of logic of discovery. Laudan goes too far in his interpretation of the historical shift from generativism to consequentialism, and his claim that the context of pursuit belongs to neither discovery nor justification is based on narrow interpretations of the contexts of discovery and justification. As a result, Laudan draws unwarranted conclusions concerning both the early and contemporary defenders of a logic of discovery. A methodological logic of discovery - which involves self-corrective methods of hypothesis generation that promote the long-term goals of science and which require consequential support for justification - is a type of logic of discovery that survives the shift to consequentialism.

Popper is well known for rejecting a logic of discovery, but he is only justified in rejecting the same type of logic of discovery that is denied by consequentialism. His own account of hypothesis generation, based on a natural selection analogy, involves an error-eliminative logic of discovery and the differences he admits between biological and conceptual evolution suggest an error-corrective logic of discovery. These types of logics of discovery are based on principles of plausibility that are used in the generation as opposed to the preliminary evaluation of hypotheses. The normative relevance of these principles is grounded in the distinction between strategic and definitory rules.

When philosophers of science speak of a "logic of discovery", what they mean is a systematic method for the generation of scientific hypotheses. The task of this dissertation is to examine arguments for and against a logic of discovery and to defend the possibility of a methodological logic of discovery as opposed to a psychological or epistemic logic of discovery. According to a methodological logic of discovery, there are systematic methods for generating hypotheses that promote the long-term goals of science, such as problem-solving success, probability, truth, or consilience. According to a psychological logic of discovery, there are systematic methods that are actually employed by scientists to generate hypotheses. According to an epistemic logic of discovery, there are systematic methods for generating hypotheses that provide essential justification for such hypotheses. ;The first chapter contains an examination of consequentialism, according to which the only means of justifying a hypothesis is by reference to its empirical consequences. The arguments for consequentialism only threaten an epistemic logic of discovery. The second chapter contains an examination of Laudan's claim that the only rationale for a logic of discovery is epistemic and that there is no epistemic rationale for a logic of discovery. Laudan draws the wrong lesson from the historical shift to consequentialism and his context of pursuit depends upon caricatures of both discovery and justification. The third chapter contains an examination of Popper's attempt to deny a logic of discovery by drawing an analogy between evolution by natural selection and scientific progress, but Popper fails to reject either a psychological or methodological logic of discovery based on this analogy. The fourth chapter contains an examination of Reichenbach's arguments against a logic of discovery, but Reichenbach's version of the discovery/justification distinction is orthogonal to the logic of discovery debate and his defense of induction implies an epistemic logic of discovery. The fifth chapter contains an examination of Hanson's attempt to provide a logic of discovery. Hanson's defense of plausibility as analogy and formal symmetry provides the best prospects for a methodological logic of discovery