•  8
    Sex, Love, and Gender: A Kantian Theory, by Helga Varden (review)
    Mind 132 (527): 890-898. 2021.
    Helga Varden’s new book aims to demonstrate that while Kant’s own views on sex are deeply problematic and harmful, his practical philosophy nonetheless contains.
  •  58
    Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6): 723-740. 2013.
    In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant declares that “Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue”. In the same text Kant refers to the duty of respect for others as a duty of virtue. It follows that the duty of respect must correspond to some end that is also a duty. What is this end? This paper endeavors to answer this question. Though Kant explicitly identifies two obligatory ends—one’s own perfection and the happiness of others —neither is a good candidate for the end which corres…Read more
  •  6
    Some Puzzles about Kantian Beneficence
    In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress, De Gruyter. pp. 1543-1550. 2021.
  •  36
    For several decades, Kant scholars, inspired by the Groundwork false-promising example, have constructed consent-based criteria for using another merely as a means. Unfortunately, these consent-based accounts produce assessments that are both counter-intuitive and un-Kantian in relatively simple cases. This article investigates why these consent-based accounts fail and offers an alternative. The Groundwork false-promising example has encouraged a problematically narrow understanding of the condi…Read more
  •  23
    Shadow students in Georgia: A Kantian condemnation
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6): 1057-1071. 2021.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
  •  5
    The Kantian Innate Right to Freedom
    In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 2329-2338. 2018.
  •  91
    Love, Respect, and Interfering with Others
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2): 174-192. 2011.
    The fact that Kantian beneficence is constrained by Kantian respect appears to seriously restrict the Kantian's moral response to agents who have embraced self-destructive ends. In this paper I defend the Kantian duties of love and respect by arguing that Kantians can recognize attempts to get an agent to change her ends as a legitimate form of beneficence. My argument depends on two key premises. First, that rational nature is not identical to the capacity to set ends, and second, that an agent…Read more
  •  158
    On the supposed moral harm of selecting for deafness
    Bioethics 25 (3): 128-136. 2011.
    This paper demonstrates that accounting for the moral harm of selecting for deafness is not as simple or obvious as the widespread negative response from the hearing community would suggest. The central questions addressed by the paper are whether our moral disquiet with regard to selecting for deafness can be adequately defended, and if so, what this might entail. The paper considers several different strategies for accounting for the supposed moral harm of selecting for deafness and concludes …Read more
  •  119
    Kantian practical love
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3): 313-331. 2010.
    In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant stipulates that ‘Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing . . . so a duty to love is an absurdity.’ Nonetheless, in the same work Kant claims that we have duties of love to other human beings. According to Kant, the kind of love which is commanded by duty is practical love. This paper defends the view that the duty of practical love articulated in the Doctrine of Virtue is distinct from the duty of beneficence and best understood as a duty of self-transformation…Read more
  •  50
    Love’s Reasons
    Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1). 2016.
  •  30
    On Virtues of Love and Wide Ethical Duties
    Kantian Review 24 (3): 415-437. 2019.
    In this article I argue that understanding the role that the virtues of love play in Kant’s ethical theory requires understanding not only the nature of the virtues themselves, but also the unique nature of wide Kantian duties. I begin by making the case that while the Doctrine of Virtue supports attributing an affective component to the virtues of love, we are right to resist attributing anaffective success conditionto these virtues. I then distinguish wide duties from negative and narrow (posi…Read more
  •  8
    This chapter contains sections titled: The Obligatory Ends Anti‐paternalism and the Duty of Beneficence Beneficence: The Finer Points The Question of Latitude Latitude and (Im)partiality Gratitude Sympathy Conclusion Bibliography.
  •  137
    On Procreative Responsibility in Assisted and Collaborative Reproduction
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1): 55-70. 2013.
    Abstract   It is common practice to regard participants in assisted and collaborative reproduction (gamete donors, embryologists, fertility doctors, etc.) as simply providing a desired biological product or medical service. These agents are not procreators in the ordinary sense, nor do they stand in any kind of meaningful parental relation to the resulting offspring. This paper challenges the common view by defending a principle of procreative responsibility and then demonstrating that this stan…Read more
  •  1111
    In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant divides duties of love into three categories: beneficent activity , gratitude and Teilnehmung – commonly referred to as the duty of sympathy . In this paper I will argue that the content and scope of the third duty of love has been underestimated by both critics and defenders of Kant's ethical theory. The account which pervades the secondary literature maintains that the third duty of love includes only two components: an obligation to make use of our natural recep…Read more
  •  25
    Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6): 723-740. 2013.
    In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant declares that “Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue”. In the same text Kant refers to the duty of respect for others as a duty of virtue. It follows that the duty of respect must correspond to some end that is also a duty. What is this end? This paper endeavors to answer this question. Though Kant explicitly identifies two obligatory ends—one’s own perfection and the happiness of others —neither is a good candidate for the end which corres…Read more