Indiana University, Bloomington
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2007
Athens, Georgia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics
Normative Ethics
  •  16
    Book Notes (review)
    with Grace A. Clement, Joshua M. Glasgow, Doran Smolkin, and Lori Watson
    Ethics 115 (4): 854-858. 2005.
  •  110
    On Procreative Responsibility in Assisted and Collaborative Reproduction
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1): 55-70. 2013.
    Abstract   It is common practice to regard participants in assisted and collaborative reproduction (gamete donors, embryologists, fertility doctors, etc.) as simply providing a desired biological product or medical service. These agents are not procreators in the ordinary sense, nor do they stand in any kind of meaningful parental relation to the resulting offspring. This paper challenges the common view by defending a principle of procreative responsibility and then demonstrating that this stan…Read more
  •  308
    In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant divides duties of love into three categories: beneficent activity , gratitude and Teilnehmung – commonly referred to as the duty of sympathy . In this paper I will argue that the content and scope of the third duty of love has been underestimated by both critics and defenders of Kant's ethical theory. The account which pervades the secondary literature maintains that the third duty of love includes only two components: an obligation to make use of our natural recep…Read more
  •  73
    Love, Respect, and Interfering with Others
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2): 174-192. 2011.
    The fact that Kantian beneficence is constrained by Kantian respect appears to seriously restrict the Kantian's moral response to agents who have embraced self-destructive ends. In this paper I defend the Kantian duties of love and respect by arguing that Kantians can recognize attempts to get an agent to change her ends as a legitimate form of beneficence. My argument depends on two key premises. First, that rational nature is not identical to the capacity to set ends, and second, that an agent…Read more
  •  19
    Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6): 723-740. 2013.