Menahem Luz

Socrates’ burial is dismissed as philosophically irrelevant in Phaedo 115c-e although it had previously been discussed by Plato’s older contemporaries. In Antisthenes’ Kyrsas dialogue describes a visit to Socrates’ tomb by a lover of Socrates who receives protreptic advice in a dream sequence while sleeping over Socrates’ grave. The dialogue is a metaphysical explanation of how Socrates’ spiritual message was continued after death. Plato underplays this metaphorical imagery by lampooning Antisthenes philosophy and his work (Phd. 81b-82e) and subsequently precludes him from an active role in the Phaedo. A similar case is the exclusion of Euclides of Megara. Fragments of a lost Socratic dialogue depict Apollodorus citing an unnamed Megarian in order to justify care for the remains of the dead. Similar mistaken notions explain Kyrsas’ belief when he lusts after Socrates even though he was dead. In spite of these disputes, the philosophers (Euclides, Antisthenes and Plato) each attempted to present Socrates’ moral influence as a force that continued after his death and burial.

In Phaedo 115c-e Socrates scornfully rebukes Crito for enquiring how Socrates should be buried for Crito had not been persuaded by the previous arguments that burying Socrates’ body is not equal to burying Socrates. A parallel account is found in Aelian and Diogenes Laertius where Apollodorus is rebuked for attempting to persuade Socrates that he should be bothered how his remains would be clothed when laid out. Several scholars have suggested this should not be considered a copy of Plato but an early proto-type written by one of his contemporaries with particular regard to Euclides of Megara. While this thesis has been criticized, further evidence will be examined in this article where the character of Apollodorus cites an unnamed Megarian examining this same argument but with conclusions different from those in Plato. Here the Megarian concludes that though the body may be separate from the soul we still show care and grief for the remains. The argument is both cogent and non-metaphysical in approach but characterized from a Socratic perspective. In the conclusions, I will attempt to reopen the case for a Euclidean origin of the Crito vignette in Phaedo 115c-e.

In the fragments of Porphyry’s On statues we find a coherent account of artistic appreciation by means of theological and metaphysical mechanisms, resolving some of the Platonic issues in Plotinus’ examination of art. He shows how divine wisdom is revealed on the level of myth and religious art, but also through philosophical contemplation. The former is through the influence of God’s powers by means of images akin to our perception used by the artist and grasped by the viewer. At the bottom level there comes sensation, through which imagery is conceived, but which imprints unclear by means of the sensually clear. Porphyry develops Plotinus’ analogy: we should learn to read truths about the gods from their imagery and statues as from books. We do not look at stelae as a mere matter of blocks of stone, but regard them as an expression of truth. Porphyry’s explanation of religious imagery offers us a new and modern rendition of artistic representation. The viewer uses the artist’s product in order to grasp conceptualized ideas behind the artist’s presentation, though some remain locked in a world of myth and physical representation, while others reach beyond to what art represents.

Apollodorus' prelude to Pl. Symp. is a complex rejection of earlier accounts of Socrates' participation in a symposium. This can be examined contextually as a literary mannerism, or sub-textually as a rejection of previous literary versions of this topos. Neither approach contradicts the other, but scholars have found difficulties in finding any earlier author who could have been rejected. Recently, it has been argued that Xen. Symp. preceded Pl. Symp. acting as a catalyst for Plato's work. However, if neither was the first on a sympotic theme in a Socratic dialogue, we need not presume that Apollodorus referred to Xenophon, but rather that both responded to an earlier author. Scholars suggest various candidates although none has been proven. However, one source has not attracted attention: two anecdotes recorded in PFlor 113 where Antisthenes depicts both Socrates and himself as critical of symposia in general. The conclusions of my paper are that the contents of these anecdotes can be seen as the raw kernel out of which both Xenophon and Plato could have responded.

P. Erlangen 4 is papyrus fragment of an ancient Greek, “Socratic” dialogue discussing cures for the of the beautiful—and, by implication, the meaning of moral beauty itself. Previous discussions have made general comparisons with the works of Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines. Prior to its philosophical analysis, I will re-examine the fragment, suggesting new reconstructions of the text, accompanied by an English translation. Although the precise authorship still remains a mystery, I will attempt to show that its philosophical language, argument and dramatic background are closer to the remains of Antisthenes than other Socratic writers and in particular to one of his Alcibiades compositions. The possibility will then be considered that it originated in one of his works or with one of his immediate followers

Apollodorus' prelude to Pl. Symp. is a complex rejection of earlier accounts of Socrates' participation in a symposium. This can be examined contextually as a literary mannerism, or sub-textually as a rejection of previous literary versions of this topos. Neither approach contradicts the other, but scholars have found difficulties in finding any earlier author who could have been rejected. Recently, it has been argued that Xen. Symp. preceded Pl. Symp. acting as a catalyst for Plato's work. However, if neither was the first on a sympotic theme in a Socratic dialogue, we need not presume that Apollodorus referred to Xenophon, but rather that both responded to an earlier author. Scholars suggest various candidates although none has been proven. However, one source has not attracted attention: two anecdotes recorded in PFlor 113 where Antisthenes depicts both Socrates and himself as critical of symposia in general. The conclusions of my paper are that the contents of these anecdotes can be seen as the raw kernel out of which both Xenophon and Plato could have responded.

Antisthenes of Athens was an older student of Socrates who had previously studied under the Sophists. His philosophical legacy also influenced Cynic and early Stoic thought. Consequently, he has left us an interesting theory of paideia followed by an even more brief one in divine paideia, the latter consisting of learning how to grasp the tenets of reason in order to complete virtue. Once properly grasped, the pupil will never lose it since it is embedded in the heart with true belief. However, there is a danger of being confused by human learning, which may delay or obviate completing divine paideia. Nonetheless, with the help of a teacher who gives a personal example, like Socrates or the mythical Centaur Chiron, the pupil has a chance of reaching his or her goal. Through a series of myths, Antisthenes gives us the foundations of his logical and ethical theory together. Reasoning is both a way to grasp virtue and also to fortify it. Although he would have chaffed under a modern university educational system, we may learn from him to value concise philosophical studies as a necessary adjunct to basic lessons in liberal arts.