•  198
    In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting ce…Read more
  •  36
    Proof that Intuitionistic Logic is not Three-Valued
    The Hemlock Papers 18 4-14. 2021.
    In this paper, we give an introduction to intuitionistic logic and a defense of it from certain formal logical critiques. Intuitionism is the thesis that mathematical objects are mental constructions produced by the faculty of a priori intuition of time. The truth of a mathematical proposition, then, consists in our knowing how to construct in intuition a corresponding state of affairs. This understanding of mathematical truth leads to a rejection of the principle, valid in classical logic, that…Read more
  •  30
    Correspondence Theory as a Genuine Theory of Truth
    Ephemeris, the Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 20 (1). 2020.
    Kwasi Wiredu argues that the correspondence theory of truth is tautologous and thus not a genuine theory of truth. After contrasting his pragmatist theory of truth with what I call Peirce's pragmaticist theory of truth, in his terminology the realist conception of reality, I argue Wiredu's pragmatist theory of truth is not a theory of the sort of truth which correspondence theory is talking about because correspondence theory is a theory of truth full-stop, while Wiredu instead offers a theory o…Read more
  •  15
    In this paper I draw on Husserl's early analysis of the frustration of an intentional act to argue against orthodox transcendental idealism, the claim that our acts of cognition can be mistaken with regard to a "matter," and are therefore objective, but this matter only has conceptual structure by virtue of human activity. For example, the proposition "My coffee cup is red" can be true or false depending on the sensations I receive (the matter of the act of cognition), which are independent of m…Read more
  •  4
    In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some asp…Read more
  •  1
    In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some asp…Read more