•  31
    Editors' note (review)
    Synthese 122 (1-2): 1-1. 2000.
  •  7
    Science and philosophy study well-being with different but complementary methods. Marry these methods and a new picture emerges: To have well-being is to be "stuck" in a positive cycle of emotions, attitudes, traits and success. This book unites the scientific and philosophical worldviews into a powerful new theory of well-being.
  •  8
    Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4): 130-131. 1997.
  •  11
    Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem
    Philosophical Studies 151 (2): 285-298. 2010.
    The generality problem is widely considered to be a devastating objection to reliabilist theories of justification. My goal in this paper is to argue that a version of the generality problem applies to all plausible theories of justification. Assume that any plausible theory must allow for the possibility of reflective justification—S’s belief, B, is justified on the basis of S’s knowledge that she arrived at B as a result of a highly reliable way of reasoning, R. The generality problem applies …Read more
  •  17
    The Network Theory of Well-Being: An Introduction
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7. 2012.
    In this paper, I propose a novel approach to investigating the nature of well-being and a new theory about well-being. The approach is integrative and naturalistic. It holds that a theory of well-being should account for two different classes of evidence – our commonsense judgments about well-being and the science of well-being. The network theory holds that a person is in the state of well-being if she instantiates a homeostatically clustered network of feelings, emotions, attitudes, behaviors,…Read more
  •  2
    Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment
    with J. D. Trout
    Oxford University Press USA. 2004.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology, which aims to liberate it from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and to treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science.
  •  40
    The Autonomy of Social Epistemology
    Episteme 2 (1): 65-78. 2005.
    Social epistemology is autonomous: When applied to the same evidential situations, the principles of social rationality and the principles of individual rationality sometimes recommend inconsistent beliefs. If we stipulate that reasoning rationally from justified beliefs to a true belief is normally sufficient for knowledge, the autonomy thesis implies that some knowledge is essentially social. When the principles of social and individual rationality are applied to justified evidence and recomme…Read more
  •  19
    Existential Cognition (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4): 130-131. 1997.
  •  11
    Elmer Daniel Klemke, 1926-2000 (review)
    with William S. Robinson
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (5). 2001.
  •  21
    Which Rights Should Be Universal? (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 59 (3): 683-685. 2006.
    Basic human rights are “necessary for a government to be relied upon to make itself more just over time”. Ultimately, Talbott grounds basic human rights in our “capacity for autonomy”. While he is prepared to grant that autonomy may be intrinsically valuable, his primary focus is showing how societies that protect autonomy by respecting basic human rights better promote their citizens’ well-being.
  •  37
    Biology, Ethics, and the Origins of Life (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 19 (3): 302-304. 1996.
  •  41
    What is this thing called Science? (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 19 (2): 204-206. 1996.
  •  172
    Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractab…Read more
  •  382
    Argumente für die naturaliste Erkenntnistheorie
    In Stefan Tolksdorf & Dirk Koppleberg (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, Mentis Publishers. pp. 245-274. 2015.
  •  83
    The Network Theory of Well-Being: An Introduction
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7. 2012.
    In this paper, I propose a novel approach to investigating the nature of well-being and a new theory about wellbeing. The approach is integrative and naturalistic. It holds that a theory of well-being should account for two different classes of evidence—our commonsense judgments about well-being and the science of well-being (i.e., positive psychology). The network theory holds that a person is in the state of well-being if she instantiates a homeostatically clustered network of feelings, emotio…Read more
  •  232
    Our aim in this paper is to bring the woefully neglected literature on predictive modeling to bear on some central questions in the philosophy of science. The lesson of this literature is straightforward: For a very wide range of prediction problems, statistical prediction rules (SPRs), often rules that are very easy to implement, make predictions than are as reliable as, and typically more reliable than, human experts. We will argue that the success of SPRs forces us to reconsider our views abo…Read more
  •  44
    A review of J.R. Brown's second edition of The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences.
  •  173
    The proper role of intuitions in epistemology
    with A. Feltz
    In M. Milkowski & K. Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Beyond Description: Normativity in Naturalized Philosophy., College Publication. 2010.
    Intuitions play an important role in contemporary philosophy. It is common for theories in epistemology, morality, semantics and metaphysics to be rejected because they are inconsistent with a widely and firmly held intuition. Our goal in this paper is to explore the role of epistemic intuitions in epistemology from a naturalistic perspective. Here is the question we take to be central: (Q) Ought we to trust our epistemic intuitions as evidence in support of our epistemological theories? We will…Read more
  •  160
    Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating
    Philosophical Studies 63 (3). 1991.
    What factors are involved in the resolution of scientific disputes? What factors make the resolution of such disputes rational? The traditional view confers an important role on observation statements that are shared by proponents of competing theories. Rival theories make incompatible (sometimes contradictory) observational predictions about a particular situation, and the prediction made by one theory is borne out while the prediction made by the other is not. Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and…Read more
  •  51
    Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992. 1992.
    The theory-ladenness of perception argument is not an argument at all. It is two clusters of arguments. The first cluster is empirical. These arguments typically begin with a discussion of one or more of the following psychological phenomena: (a) the conceptual penetrability of the visual system, (b) voluntary perceptual reversal of ambiguous figures, (c) adaptation to distorting lenses, or (d) expectation effects. From this evidence, proponents of theory-ladenness typically conclude that percep…Read more
  •  57
    An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 63 19-34. 1998.
    Why should a thought experiment, an experiment that only exists in people's minds, alter our fundamental beliefs about reality? After all, isn't reasoning from the imaginary to the real a sign of psychosis? A historical survey of how thought experiments have shaped our physical laws might lead one to believe that it's not the case that the laws of physics lie - it's that they don't even pretend to tell the truth. My aim in this paper is to defend an account of thought experiments that fits smoot…Read more
  •  131
    The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, an…Read more
  •  23
    Semantic essentialism holds that any scientific term that appears in a well-confirmed scientific theory has a fixed kernel of meaning. Semantic essentialism cannot make sense of the strategies scientists use to argue for their views. Newton's central optical expression "light ray" suggests a context-sensitive view of scientific language. On different occasions, Newton's expression could refer to different things depending on his particular argumentative goals - a visible beam, an irreducibly sma…Read more
  •  232
    Why Thought Experiments are Not Arguments
    Philosophy of Science 66 (4): 534-541. 1999.
    Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiment's outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experi…Read more
  •  22
    Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue epistemic internalists take to be central to justification. In normal circumstances and in the long run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist's epistemic virtues. In Sect…Read more