Michael Bolker

In the history of genetics, the information-theoretical description of the gene, beginning in the early 1960s, had a significant effect on the concept of the gene. Information is a highly complex metaphor which is applicable in view of the description of substances, processes, and spatio-temporal organisation. Thus, information can be understood as a functional particle of many different language games (some of them belonging to subdisciplines of genetics, as the biochemical language game, some of them belonging to linguistics and informatics). It is this wide covering of different language games that justifies the common description of genes x, y, z as containing information for the phenotypic traits X, Y, Z (or the genome as storage for the information of a whole organism). However, if information is taken as the explanans and phenotypic traits or organisms as the explananda, then a description of the explanandum is of prior importance before the explanans can be characterised. This way of thinking could be useful for future discussions on the strikingly dominant information -metaphor, and the different gene concepts as well. The article illustrates this in two steps. First, a condensed overview on the history of genetics is given, which can be divided into three parts: (1) genetics without genes, (2) genetics with genes, but without information, (3) genetics with genes and information. It is assumed that this provides not only some historical knowledge about the origin of genetics and the introduction of technical terms, but offers at least preliminary insight into the methodological structure of genetic descriptions. In a second step, we redraw Spemann’s disturbation experiments to discuss our thesis that genetic information is not a natural entity, but part of a causality-language game which is secondarily added to the descriptions of interventionalistic practices, viz. experimental approaches

Information: a universal metaphor in natural and cultural sciences? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10202-008-0046-2 Authors Michael Bölker, Philipps-Universität Marburg Fachbereich 17: Biologie Karl-von-Frisch-Straße 8 35032 Marburg Germany Mathias Gutmann, Philipps-Universität Marburg Institut für Philosophie Wilhelm Röpke Str. 6B 35032 Marburg Germany Wolfgang Hesse, Philipps-Universität Marburg Fachbereich 12: Mathematik und Informatik Hans-Meerwein-Straße 35032 Marburg Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 5 Journal Issue Volume 5, Numbers 3-4

Genetic variability and diversity are the result of a mutation-selection balance that acts permanently within and between species. The presence of deleterious mutations is a necessary consequence of this process and thus the price paid by a species for its capacity for further evolution (Haldane 1937, Am Nat 71:337–349). Recent estimations of mutation rate in the human lineage has revived the debate as to whether the high number of deleterious mutations poses a severe problem for the future of mankind. Theoretical considerations allow a scenario in which the survival of the human race is maintained by truncation selection of deleterious mutations that removes as many mutations as appear anew in every generation. In this case our genetic burden is carried by those individuals that suffer a genetic death resulting from random distribution of deleterious alleles. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether the mutation rate may set absolute limits on the complexity of a species