•  300
    Classical Opacity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3): 524-566. 2020.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  50
    Semantic indecision
    Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1): 108-143. 2018.
    Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
  •  51
    Bunder’s paradox
    Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (4): 829-844. 2020.
    Systems of illative logic are logical calculi formulated in the untyped λ-calculus supplemented with certain logical constants.1 In this short paper, I consider a paradox that arises in illative logic. I note two prima facie attractive ways of resolving the paradox. The first is well known to be consistent, and I briefly outline a now standard construction used by Scott and Aczel that establishes this. The second, however, has been thought to be inconsistent. I show that this isn’t so, by provid…Read more
  •  47
    Unruly Words (review)
    Philosophical Review 124 (3): 415-419. 2015.
  •  370
    I consider a puzzling case presented by Jose Benardete, and by appeal to this case develop a paradox involving counterfactual conditionals. I then show that this paradox may be leveraged to argue for certain non-obvious claims concerning the logic of counterfactuals.
  •  244
    A Problem for Credal Consequentialism
    In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism, . forthcoming.
  •  32
    Calibration and Probabilism
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1. 2014.
  •  164
    Rational Probabilistic Incoherence
    Philosophical Review 122 (4): 527-575. 2013.
    Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is fal…Read more
  •  59
    Credence in the Image of Chance
    Philosophy of Science 82 (4): 626-648. 2015.
    In this article, I consider what sorts of chance credence norms can be justified by appeal to the idea that ideal credences should line up with the chances. I argue that the Principal Principle cannot be so justified but that an alternative norm, the Temporal Principle—which maintains that an agent’s credence in a proposition ϕ, conditional on the temporal proposition that says that the chance of ϕ is x, should be x—can be so justified.
  •  114
    Vagueness and semantic indiscriminability
    Philosophical Studies 160 (3): 365-377. 2012.
    I argue, pace Timothy Williamson, that one cannot provide an adequate account of what it is for a case to be borderline by appealing to facts about our inability to discriminate our actual situation from nearby counterfactual situations in which our language use differs in subtle ways. I consider the two most natural ways of using such resources to provide an account of what it is for a case to be borderline and argue that both face crippling defects. I argue that the problems faced by these two…Read more
  •  153
    Belief and Indeterminacy
    Philosophical Review 121 (1): 1-54. 2012.
    An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitu…Read more
  •  2000
    Doxastic Logic
    In Jonathan Weisberg & Richard Pettigrew (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology, Philpapers Foundation. pp. 499-541. 2019.
  •  386
    Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating Belief
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3): 513-547. 2018.
    In this paper, I argue that some plausible principles concerning which credences are rationally permissible for agents given information about one another’s epistemic and credal states have some surprising consequences for which credences an agent ought to have in light of self-locating information. I provide a framework that allows us to state these constraints and draw out these consequences precisely. I then consider and assess the prospects for rejecting these prima facie plausible principle…Read more