•  572
    This paper aims to solve a puzzle for instrumental conceptions of epistemic normativity. The puzzle is this: if the usefulness of epistemic norms explains their normative grip on us, why does it seem improper to violate these norms even when doing so would benefit us? To solve this puzzle, we argue that epistemic instrumentalists must adopt a more social approach to normativity. In particular, they should not account for the nature of epistemic normativity by appealing to the goals of individual…Read more
  •  39
    Summary of What’s the Point of Knowledge? Oxford University Press, 2019
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    This article summarizes the key ideas in my book, ‘What's the Point of Knowledge?’. First, I articulate the method of function first epistemology, which looks at our epistemology from a practical point of view. Second, I outline my core hypothesis about the purpose of the concept of knowledge, namely, we have this concept to identify reliable informants. Third, I explain how this account is used to resolve a number of epistemological issues. I also draw connections between pragmatism and my own …Read more
  •  453
    Is Intellectual Humility Compatible with Political Conviction?
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. forthcoming.
    New research suggests that a healthy democracy requires intellectual humility. When citizens are intellectually humble, they are less polarized, more tolerant and respectful of others, and display greater empathy for political opponents. But a flourishing democracy also requires people with political convictions. If the electorate were apathetic, they would not participate in democratic decision-making. Do these two democratic ideals conflict? The standard view in philosophy and psychology is th…Read more
  •  612
    Disagreement and Contemporary Political Philosophy
    In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, Routledge. forthcoming.
    This chapter discusses the nature and value of political disagreement, with reference to contemporary work in political philosophy. I will attempt to answer the following questions: Why do we disagree? Is political disagreement a good thing? Do we have a duty to disagree? Should we expect consensus or mere compromise in politics? When is civil disobedience a justified way to express disagreement with the law? Is consensus a threat to democracy?
  •  1140
    The Politics of Post-Truth
    Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 35 (1): 40-62. 2023.
    A prevalent political narrative is that we are facing an epistemological crisis, where many citizens no longer care about truth and facts. Yet the view that we are living in a post-truth era relies on some implicit questionable empirical and normative assumptions. The post-truth rhetoric converts epistemic issues into motivational issues, treating people with whom we disagree as if they no longer believe in or care about truth. This narrative is also dubious on epistemic, moral, and political gr…Read more
  •  15
    Reply to Gardiner and DiPaolo
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    In this article, I reply to comments on my book by Georgi Gardiner and Joshua DiPaolo. I will first reply to Gardiner's comments, focusing primarily on her doubts about the adjudicative power of function-first epistemology. I will then reply to DiPaolo, who argues that I have misidentified that primary function of the concept of knowledge.
  •  118
    Political Conviction, Intellectual Humility, and Quietism
    Journal of Positive Psychology. forthcoming.
    In his overview of recent work on intellectual humility, Nathan Ballantyne (2021) highlights some of the potential ‘dark sides’ of intellectual humility (IH) and calls for a critical study of the ‘value-theory’ of IH. In this article, we sketch out three ways that IH may threaten political conviction. We end our response by arguing that some forms of IH include different kinds of quietism about political convictions, which do not necessarily equate with a lack of conviction.
  •  22
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 870-873, June 2022.
  •  31
  •  800
    Is There a Duty to Speak Your Mind?
    Social Epistemology 1-16. forthcoming.
    In his recent book, Joshi (2021) argues that the open exchange of ideas is essential for the flourishing of individuals and society. He provides two arguments for this claim. First, speaking your mind is essential for the common good: we enhance our collective ability to reach the truth if we share evidence and offer different perspectives. Second, speaking your mind is good for your own sake: it is necessary to develop your rational faculties and exercise intellectual independence, both of whic…Read more
  •  412
    The Practical Origins of Ideas, by Matthieu Queloz (review)
    Mind 132 (528): 1185-1193. 2022.
    Philosophy is a discipline of grand abstractions. Truth, justice, knowledge, goodness, democracy, beauty, freedom, and other venerable ideas have been at the ce.
  •  483
    The Concept of Knowledge
    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021.
    Knowledge is central to epistemology. Indeed, the word ‘epistemology’ comes from the Greek word epistêmê, which is often translated as ‘knowledge.’ But what is knowledge? Why do we value it? How is it acquired? And how much of it do we have? This article explores the nature, significance, sources, and extent of human knowledge.
  •  325
    Public Discourse and Its Problems
    Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. forthcoming.
    It is widely believed that open and public speech is at the heart of the democratic ideal. Public discourse is instrumentally epistemically valuable for identifying good policies, as well as necessary for resisting domination (e.g., by vocally challenging decision-makers, demanding public justifications, and using democratic speech to hold leaders accountable). But in our highly polarized and socially fragmented political environment, an increasingly pressing question is: do actual democratic so…Read more
  •  29
    Replies to Henderson, Elgin and Lawlor
    Analysis 81 (1): 114-129. 2021.
    I acquired many intellectual debts while writing What’s the Point of Knowledge?, but I am especially indebted to my three symposiasts. David Henderson’s work helped me to appreciate the value of thinking about the point of epistemic evaluation; Catherine Elgin’s writings prompted me to investigate the purpose of the concept of understanding; and Krista Lawlor’s 2013 book revealed important connections between three of my primary epistemological interests: the role of epistemic evaluation, the se…Read more
  •  903
    Understanding Philosophy
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about …Read more
  •  46
    Précis of "What’s the Point of Knowledge?"
    Analysis 81 (1): 85-87. 2021.
    I acquired many intellectual debts while writing What’s the Point of Knowledge?, but I am especially indebted to my three symposiasts. David Henderson’s work helped me to appreciate the value of thinking about the point of epistemic evaluation; Catherine Elgin’s writings prompted me to investigate the purpose of the concept of understanding; and Krista Lawlor’s 2013 book revealed important connections between three of my primary epistemological interests: the role of epistemic evaluation, the se…Read more
  •  2413
    Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters?
    Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 21 (1): 29-54. 2022.
    It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals also tend to be the most partisan, and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to d…Read more
  •  1563
    The Point of Political Belief
    In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, Routledge. 2021.
    An intuitive and widely accepted view is that (a) beliefs aim at truth, (b) many citizens have stable and meaningful political beliefs, and (c) citizens choose to support political candidates or parties on the basis of their political beliefs. We argue that all three claims are false. First, we argue that political beliefs often differ from ordinary world-modelling beliefs because they do not aim at truth. Second, we draw on empirical evidence from political science and psychology to argue that …Read more
  •  1149
    A Guide to Political Epistemology
    In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2024.
    Political epistemology is a newly flourishing area of philosophy, but there is no comprehensive overview to this burgeoning field. This chapter maps out the terrain of political epistemology, highlights some of the key questions and topics of this field, draws connections across seemingly disparate areas of work, and briefly situates this field within its historical and contemporary contexts.
  •  102
    The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology (edited book)
    with Jeroen de Ridder
    Routledge. 2021.
    This handbook provides an overview of key ideas, questions, and puzzles in political epistemology. It is divided into seven sections: (1) Politics and Truth: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives; (2) Political Disagreement and Polarization; (3) Fake News, Propaganda, Misinformation; (4) Ignorance and Irrationality in Politics; (5) Epistemic Virtues and Vices in Politics; (6) Democracy and Epistemology; (7) Trust, Expertise, and Doubt.
  •  144
    Political Epistemology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    As current events around the world have illustrated, epistemological issues are at the center of our political lives. It has become increasingly difficult to discern legitimate sources of evidence, misinformation spreads faster than ever, and the role of truth in politics has allegedly decayed in recent years. It is therefore no coincidence that political discourse is currently saturated with epistemic notions like ‘post-truth,’ ‘fake news,’ ‘truth decay,’ ‘echo chambers,’ and ‘alternative facts…Read more
  •  1563
    Disagreement or Badmouthing? The Role of Expressive Discourse in Politics
    In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2021.
    A striking feature of political discourse is how prone we are to disagree. Political opponents will even give different answers to factual questions, which suggests that opposing parties cannot agree on facts any more than they can on values. This impression is widespread and supported by survey data. I will argue, however, that the extent and depth of political disagreement is largely overstated. Many political disagreements are merely illusory. This claim has several important upshots. I will …Read more
  •  2569
    Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation
    In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, Routledge. 2021.
    This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
  •  109
    Assertion, action, and context
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 731-743. 2020.
    A common objection to both contextualism and relativism about knowledge ascriptions is that they threaten knowledge norms of assertion and action. Consequently, if there is good reason to accept knowledge norms of assertion or action, there is good reason to reject both contextualism and relativism. In this paper we argue that neither contextualism nor relativism threaten knowledge norms of assertion or action.
  •  538
    What is human understanding and why should we care about it? I propose a method of philosophical investigation called ‘function-first epistemology’ and use this method to investigate the nature and value of understanding-why. I argue that the concept of understanding-why serves the practical function of identifying good explainers, which is an important role in the general economy of our concepts. This hypothesis sheds light on a variety of issues in the epistemology of understanding including t…Read more
  •  1287
    Intellectual Humility and the Curse of Knowledge
    In Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), Arrogance and Polarisation, Routledge. 2021.
    This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of i…Read more
  •  2105
    Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding
    American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3): 269-290. 2021.
    The philosophical interest in the nature, value, and varieties of human understanding has swelled in recent years. This article will provide an overview of new research in the epistemology of understanding, with a particular focus on the following questions: What is understanding and why should we care about it? Is understanding reducible to knowledge? Does it require truth, belief, or justification? Can there be lucky understanding? Does it require ‘grasping’ or some kind of ‘know-how’? This cl…Read more
  •  247
    Skepticism: Impractical, Therefore Implausible
    Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 143-158. 2019.
    The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismi…Read more
  •  512
    Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3): 591-611. 2019.
    Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because …Read more
  •  164
    This book is about the nature and value of knowledge. At its core is a simple idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult philosophical questions by reflecting on the role (purpose, function) of epistemic evaluation in human life. I call this approach ‘function-first epistemology’. I use this method to illuminate the nature and value of knowledge, the foundations of epistemic normativity, the epistemology of testimony, and skepticism.