Michael Herbert Nagenborg

J. van den Hoven suggested to analyse privacy from the perspective of informational justice, whereby he referred to the concept of distributive justice presented by M. Walzer in “ Spheres of Justice ”. In “privacy as contextual integrity” Helen Nissenbaum did also point to Walzer’s approach of complex equality as well to van den Hoven’s concept. In this article I will analyse the challenges of applying Walzer’s concept to issues of informational privacy. I will also discuss the possibilities of framing privacy from the point of the “art of separation” by looking at the intersection of information infrastructures and institutions.

In this paper I will argue that artificial moral agents are a fitting subject of intercultural information ethics because of the impact they may have on the relationship between information rich and information poor countries. I will give a limiting definition of AMAs first, and discuss two different types of AMAs with different implications from an intercultural perspective. While AMAs following preset rules might raise con-cerns about digital imperialism, AMAs being able to adjust to their user‘s behavior will lead us to the question what makes an AMA ―moral‖? I will argue that this question does present a good starting point for an inter-cultural dialogue which might be helpful to overcome the notion of Africa as a mere victim

This paper is as much about surveillance as about persuasive technologies (PTs). With regard to PTs it raises the question about the ethical limits of persuasion. It will be argued that even some forms of self-imposed persuasive soft surveillance technologies may be considered unethical. Therefore, the ethical evaluation of surveillance technologies should not be limited to privacy issues. While it will also be argued that PTs may become instrumental in pre-commitment strategies, it will also be demonstrated that the use of persuasive surveillance technologies in order to influence the users to become more compliant, to get their consent more easily or making it harder to opt out of the system does give rise to ethical issues.

There are only a few ethical regulations that deal explicitly with robots, in contrast to a vast number of regulations, which may be applied. We will focus on ethical issues with regard to “responsibility and autonomous robots”, “machines as a replacement for humans”, and “tele-presence”. Furthermore we will examine examples from special fields of application (medicine and healthcare, armed forces, and entertainment). We do not claim to present a complete list of ethical issue nor of regulations in the field of robotics, but we will demonstrate that there are legal challenges with regard to these issues

Robots are leaving factories and entering urban spaces. In this paper, I will explore how we can integrate robots of various types into the urban landscape. I will distinguish between two perspectives: the responsible design and use of urban robots and robots as part of responsible urban innovations. The first viewpoint considers issues arising from the use of a robot in an urban environment. To develop a substantive understanding of Responsible Urban Robotics, we need to focus on normative implications of city life as the context in which in robots are being used. I will refer to the desirable qualities of city life as “cityness” and will argue that we should design for cityness. The second approach asks how robots might be used to address challenges specific to cities. From the perspective of RRI, this may require participatory approaches in which the needs of the stakeholders are addressed. But we may also find inspiration in the work undertaken in architecture on expanding the concept and field to ensure that architects not only provide services to the lucky few but also create useful and beautiful spaces for the many. A dialogue with architects, urban designers, and urban planners may also be needed to successfully address the spatial issues raised by the presence of robots in the city.

Personalised learning systems—systems that predict learning needs to tailor education to the unique learning needs of individual students—are gaining rapid popularity. Praise for educational technology is often focused on how technology will benefit school systems, but there is a lack of understanding of how it will affect the student and the learning process. By uncovering what the meaning of ‘personal’ is in educational philosophy and as embodied in the technology, we illustrate that these two understandings are different regarding the autonomy of the student. Personalised learning technology, therefore, bears the risk of failing to achieve its educational ideal of what personalisation should be. We also illustrate how personalised learning technology effects student autonomy by requiring the intensive tracking of the learning process, exposing them to privacy and data protection risks. We do not claim that education does not need technology, but we want to illustrate the importance of values as drivers of innovation.

The contributions in this volume map out how technologies are used and designed to plan, maintain, govern, demolish, and destroy the city. The chapters demonstrate how urban technologies shape, and are shaped, by fundamental concepts and principles such as citizenship, publicness, democracy, and nature. The many authors herein explore how to think of technologically mediated urban space as part of the human condition. The volume will thus contribute to the much-needed discussion on technology-enabled urban futures from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. This perspective also contributes to the discussion and process of making cities ‘smart’ and just. This collection appeals to students, researchers, and professionals within the fields of philosophy of technology, urban planning, and engineering.

The use of genetic information about a patient may cause serious concern within the discourse on informa¬tional privacy. In our article we would like to discuss a positive example of a diagnostic use of genetic infor¬mation in the field of molecular genetics. With regard to this example we will discuss the question who owns the genetic information to determine who should decide which data is to be stored or deleted. We will use a Kantian concept of property in order to show that the genetic information in the example given is to be considered the property of the patient. We shall argue, that the information should be considered as a part of the medical sphere, which is to be informationally sealed. Although we present hereby a theoretical frame¬work for a design of an appropriate information infrastructure, we will finally point out to the high costs of such an infrastructure

Technology is no stranger to the city. Cities are planned, built, maintained, governed, demolished, and destroyed by technical means. Yet, the city has yet to receive much attention within the philosophy of technology. This volume addresses this gap, and in doing so contributes to the much-needed discussion on technology-enabled urban futures from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. In this introductory chapter, the larger volume is introduced by reflecting on the rationale and need for such a collection, sketching the main themes analyzed throughout, and providing an overview of the contributions.

P. M. Asaro: What should We Want from a Robot Ethic? G. Tamburrini: Robot Ethics: A View from the Philosophy of Science B. Becker: Social Robots - Emotional Agents: Some Remarks on Naturalizing Man-machine Interaction E. Datteri, G. Tamburrini: Ethical Reflections on Health Care Robotics P. Lin, G. Bekey, K. Abney: Robots in War: Issues of Risk and Ethics J. Altmann: Preventive Arms Control for Uninhabited Military Vehicles J. Weber: Robotic warfare, Human Rights & The Rhetorics of Ethical Machines T. Nishida: Towards Robots with Good Will R. Capurro: Ethics and Robotics

Der Begriff ›Medium‹ lässt sich im Deutschen seit dem 17. Jahrhundert in der natur- und sprachwissenschaftlichen Fachsprache nachweisen. Seit der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts wird ›Medium‹ allgemein für das »Mittlere« oder das »Vermittelnde« gebraucht, z. B. auch für das zwischen Dies- und Jenseits vermittelnde personale ›Medium‹. Im 20. Jahrhundert meint insbesondere der Plural, ›die Medien‹, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt etablierten Medien wie das Buch, die Zeitung, das Radio, das Fernsehen oder den Film.

Review of Hartmut Gieselmann: Der virtuelle Krieg. Zwischen Schein und Wirklichkeit im Computerspiel. Hannover: Offizin-Verlag 2002. The topic of this book is the genre of war game. The author focuses on three main directions, each of which is dealt with by way of exemplary representatives. In this respect his main interest is in the question of how media are able to contribute to making real violence disappear for perception. In this respect his critical analysis aims at the staging of war as a technological rumpus without any victims. This book is particularly worth recommending as the author succeeds in viewing at the genre of the first-person-shooter within a wider context

Review of Joost Raessens and Jeffrey Goldstein: Handbook of computer game studies. Cambridge, Massachu-setts – London, England: MIT Press 2005. By more than 450 large-format pages the publishers offer a view of current research in the field of “game studies”. With almost no exception, the 27 articles are of high quality. Readers, however, who are familiar with the works of the single authors are offered only little new information. Unfortunately, the authors mostly focus on western, particularly US-American games and players. But still the book can be recommended both as a consolidating introduction and a textbook