•  19
    Margaret MacDonald and Gilbert Ryle: a philosophical friendship
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1-24. forthcoming.
    This article considers the personal and philosophical relationship between two philosophers, Margaret MacDonald and Gilbert Ryle. I show that a letter from MacDonald to Ryle found at Linacre Colleg...
  •  210
    The multiplicity of general propositions
    Noûs 26 (4): 409-426. 1992.
  •  19
    'If' is unambiguous
    Noûs 21 (2): 199-217. 1987.
  • Of the association for symbolic logic
    with Warren Goldfarb, Jeremy Avigad, Andrew Arana, Geoffrey Hellman, and Dana Scott
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (3): 438. 2004.
  •  28
    Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois April 23–24, 2004
    with Warren Goldfarb, Erich Reck, Jeremy Avigad, Andrew Arana, Geoffrey Hellman, Colin McLarty, and Dana Scott
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (3). 2004.
  •  60
    Gyula begins with a contrast between contemporary scare-quotes essentialism and Aristotelian full-blooded essentialism. The former is a semantic thesis couched in the vocabulary of possible-worlds semantics, holding that some terms are rigid designators, while the latter is a metaphysical thesis, couched in a more ancient vocabulary, holding that things have essences. Gyula argues that the more traditional metaphysical framework deserves reconsideration, both because it can help us with problems…Read more
  •  5
    Paradox and reference
    In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 33--47. 1990.
  •  99
    My title1 is taken from one of the most obscure, and most discussed, sections of an already obscure and much discussed work, the discussion of the self, the world, and solipsism in sections 5.6-5.641 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus.2 Wittgenstein writes: 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not…Read more
  •  17
    Set-theoretic realism and arithmetic
    Philosophical Studies 64 (3). 1991.
  •  92
    Kripke and the logic of truth
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3). 1988.
  •  61
    Ryle’s “Intellectualist Legend” in Historical Context
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5). 2017.
    Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that emerged from his criticism of the “intellectualist legend” that to do something intelligently is “to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice,” and became a philosophical commonplace in the second half of the last century. In this century Jason Stanley has attacked Ryle’s distinction, arguing that “knowing-how is a species of knowing-that,” and accusing Ryle of setting up a straw man in his critique of “intellectualis…Read more
  •  30
    Ideology and Knowledge-How: A Rylean Perspective
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (3): 295-311. 2016.
    In work culminating in Know How, Jason Stanley argues, against Gilbert Ryle, that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. In How Propaganda Works, Stanley portrays this work as undermining a “flawed ideology” supporting elitist valuations of intellectual work and workers. However, the link between Stanley’s two philosophical projects is weak. Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that lacks the political consequences foreseen by Stanley. Versions of “intellectualism” have …Read more
  •  26
    Mark Textor, Frege on Sense and Reference (review)
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (10). 2014.
    London and New York. Routledge, 2011, x + 291. $125.00 ; $33.95. ISBN 978-0-415-41961-1.
  •  1
  •  32
    Contemporary Analytic Philosophy
    Teaching Philosophy 21 (3): 286-289. 1998.
  •  38
    Representation or Inference: Must We Choose? Should We?
    In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explicit, Routledge. pp. 227. 2010.
  •  87
    Sense and reference: the origins and development of the distinction
    In Tom Ricketts & Michael D. Potter (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege, Cambridge University Press. pp. 220--292. 2010.
    Frege’s distinction between sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung) is his most influential contribution to philosophy, however central it was to his own projects, and however he may have conceived its importance. Philosophers of language influenced by, or reacting against the distinction, and historians of philosophy commenting on it, have all contributed to the voluminous literature surrounding it.1 Nonetheless in this essay I hope to shed new light on the distinction by considering it in the con…Read more
  •  40
    Marti on Descriptions in Carnap’s S
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6): 629-634. 1997.
    This note is a friendly amendment to Marti's analysis of the failure of Føllesdal's argument that modal distinctions collapse in Carnap's logic S2. Føllesdal's argument turns on the treatment of descriptions. Marti considers how modal descriptions, which Carnap banned, might be handled; she adopts an approach which blocks Føllesdal's argument, but requires a separate treatment of non-modal descriptions. I point out that a more general treatment of descriptions in S2 is possible, and indeed is im…Read more
  •  7
    Book reviews (review)
    Philosophia Mathematica 4 (3): 294-297. 1996.
  •  98
    Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 571-584. 2000.
    George Wilson has recently defended Kripke's well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein against the criticisms of John McDowell. Wilson claims that these criticisms rest on misunderstandings of Kripke and that, when correctly understood, Kripke's interpretation stands up to them well. In particular, Wilson defends Kripke's Wittgenstein against the charge of "non-factualism" about meaning. However, Wilson has not appreciated the full significance of McDowell's criticism. I use a brief exploration …Read more
  •  48
    How not to argue for incompatibilism
    Erkenntnis 60 (1): 1-26. 2004.
      Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be…Read more
  •  80
    The argument of "on denoting"
    Philosophical Review 103 (2): 249-297. 1994.