Michael Kryluk

This essay examines one of the most obscure and controversial tenets of Kant’s critical philosophy, his claim in the Critique of Practical Reason that the moral law is immediately and unquestionably valid as an a priori fact of reason (Factum der Vernunft). This argument curiously inverts Kant’s earlier stance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which he justifies the reality of the categorical imperative through a much more cautious and qualified authentication of transcendental freedom. Against constructivist readings which tend to downplay the justificatory burden of the Factum, I claim that Kant’s position is best understood as a transcendental argument. In other words, he argues from a given or assured conditioned, consciousness of binding moral obligation, to the sole condition of its possibility in transcendental freedom. In order to rebut the standard objections prompted by this line of interpretation, I emphasize the technical function of Kant’s Factum as both a deed (Tat) and product (Tatsache) of practical reason.

This article is an Introduction to a translation of ‘Zur Beurteilung der Schrift Das Wesen des Christentums’ by Ludwig Feuerbach. To my knowledge, no English translation of this essay currently exists. It was published in February 1842 and functions as both a general reply to critics of his 1841 book The Essence of Christianity, as well as a specific response to the claim of an anonymous reviewer that Feuerbach’s interpretation of religion was the same as that of his fellow Young Hegelian Bruno Bauer. Besides capturing a central moment in Feuerbach’s development between The Essence of Christianity and his well-known works of 1842–4, the essay also sheds light on the rest of the Young Hegelian movement and provides crucial context for some of Marx’s later comments on Feuerbach and his philosophy.

In this essay, I examine Kant’s interpretation of Rousseau through the lens of Reflection 6593. This Reflection deserves scrutiny because it serves as a bridge between Kant’s well-known engagement with Rousseau in the mid-1760s and his later discussions of the vocation of the human being in the lectures on ethics and anthropology. Through a close reading of R 6593, I argue that the Reflection offers the earliest evidence of Kant’s philosophy of history and its integration into his treatment of the human vocation. This change, I propose, is instigated by Rousseau’s “Abstract” of St. Pierre’s Perpetual Peace. I conclude that R 6593 is a crucial indicator of Kant’s evolving views on Rousseau and shows his enduring importance for understanding the formation of Kant’s mature political thought.