University of Reading
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2000
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept another alternative Most is really inference to the best explanation, which can't rule out in principle relevance of empirical investigation
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept another alternative In between: as with moral cognitive/non-cognitivism.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept another alternative not convinced that determinism/causation is well-formulated (a la Anscombe)
God: theism and atheism Agnostic/undecided Agnostic in principle - arguments are too indecisive to generate knowledge
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean See comment on free will/determinism. Still working through Nancy Cartwright's views...
Logic: classical and non-classical Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept an intermediate view
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism The question is too unclear to answer
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept an intermediate view I know it seems there isn't space - I'm working on it!
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept another alternative Mutual irreducibility of phenomenology and representation a la Wollheim
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch There is no fact of the matter
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: epistemic
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: inconceivable