Michael Newall

This chapter examines the nature and artistic quality of double portraits. Double portraiture poses unexpected and interesting challenges to existing philosophical accounts of portraiture. We give an account of double portraiture as involving the representation of a significant relationship between two subjects, and an expression of its character. The account argues that a picture with two single portraits does not necessarily make a double portrait, and that a double portrait does not have to contain two single portraits. We then show how this yields a rich understanding of the artistic values of the genre, and explore the surprising implications for what may be considered a double portrait.

*Winner of the American Society for Aesthetics 2019 Outstanding Monograph Prize* Until now, research on art schools has been largely occupied with the facts of particular schools and teachers. This book presents a philosophical account of the underlying practices and ideas that have come to shape contemporary art school teaching in the UK, US and Europe. It analyses two models that, hidden beneath the diversity of contemporary artist training, have come to dominate art schools. The first of these is essentially an old approach: a training guided by the artistic values of a single artist-teacher. The second dates from the 1960s, and is based around the group crit, in which diverse voices contribute to an artist’s development. Understanding the underlying principles and possibilities of these two models, which sit together in an uneasy tension, gives new insights into the character of contemporary art school teaching, demonstrating how art schools shape art and artists, how they can be a potent engine of creativity in contemporary culture and how they contribute to artistic research. A Philosophy of the Art School draws on first-hand accounts of art school teaching, and is deeply informed by disciplines ranging from art history and art theory, to the philosophy of art, education and creativity.

Resemblances between colour pictures and their subject-matter can be identified. I use insights from perceptual psychology to develop a description of these shared colour properties. While resemblances do exist, they do not support resemblance theories of depiction. Instead, the character of these resemblances is determined by the construction of our visual system, and is not necessary for depiction. These results support a theory of depiction which holds that our abilities of visual recognition are crucial to our ability to understand pictures

This article is primarily concerned with the philosophical problems that arise out of a consideration of painting. By painting I mean of course not any kind of application of paint to a surface – house painting for instance – but painting as an art, to use Richard Wollheim's phrase. Since Plato, philosophy has intermittently been concerned with these problems, and over the past 30 years, painting has come under a new focus as philosophy of art has increasingly turned its attention to the issues that arise from particular art forms. I will also draw on some ideas developed in art history and theory, which have a suitably philosophical, that is, general or foundational, character. There are many philosophical issues that arise equally from painting and other art forms, but for just this reason, they are best addressed in a broader cross-art-form context, and I will mostly avoid dealing with them here. Instead, I will focus on issues that arise solely or with a special force from a consideration of painting. It will be helpful to roughly arrange these in two categories. The first is representation; the second is form. We shall see that these categories are difficult to keep separate with regard to painting and overlap at various points

Philosophers of art use the term ‘seeing-in’ to describe an important part of our experience of pictures: we often ‘see’ a picture’s subject matter ‘in’ its surface. This paper proposes that seeing-in is illuminated by a perceptual phenomenon that has received extensive attention in perceptual psychology: the perception of transparency. It is generally accepted that transparency perception is governed by laws of ‘scission’. I argue that some instances of seeing-in can be straightforwardly understood as a kind of transparency effect, and that all seeing-in is illuminated by these laws