Michael O'Donovan

Recurrent microdeletions and microduplications of a 600-kb genomic region of chromosome 16p11.2 have been implicated in childhood-onset developmental disorders. We report the association of 16p11.2 microduplications with schizophrenia in two large cohorts. The microduplication was detected in 12/1,906 cases and 1/3,971 controls from the initial cohort, and in 9/2,645 cases and 1/2,420 controls of the replication cohort. The 16p11.2 microduplication was associated with a 14.5-fold increased risk of schizophrenia ) in the combined sample. A meta-analysis of datasets for multiple psychiatric disorders showed a significant association of the microduplication with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and autism. In contrast, the reciprocal microdeletion was associated only with autism and developmental disorders. Head circumference was larger in patients with the microdeletion than in patients with the microduplication. © 2009 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved.

Philosophy in the Flesh is a small, important book wrapped inside a large self-important one. It begins by announcing three major “findings” of cognitive science: “The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious.concepts are largely metaphorical,” which between them bring to an end “more than two millennia of a priori philosophical speculation”. To help mitigate this mortal blow to Western thought, Lakoff and Johnson helpfully propose, from empirical foundations, to build philosophy anew. The findings they detail are of extreme importance, the arguments in support of them are challenging, innovative, and largely convincing, and their willingness to explicate their implications is laudable. Yet their explicit and oft-repeated expectation that the work of cognitive scientists will deeply change the practice of philosophy, “require our culture to abandon some of its deepest philosophical assumptions,” and become “one of our most profound resources for self knowledge” is based on a questionable understanding of the foundations of philosophy, an apparently limited appreciation of the breadth and diversity of Western thought, and, more importantly, on a vision of the role of science in culture that is at best somewhat naïve, and at worst a little dangerous.

This collection of essays, all previously published, offers selections from the life work of Robert Nozick. The essays range widely both temporally, from 1969 to 1995, and topically, from an analytic study of coercion to thoughts on Socrates’ profession of ignorance, to short “philosophical fictions.” The themes and approaches will be familiar to those who know anything of Nozick’s work. More than half the book is taken up by formal, analytic studies of topics of social, political, and moral significance. Questions about how we might decide between competing individual preferences, or what strategies of decision making are the most rational and/or effective, or even how we come to judge certain actions immoral, are treated with remarkable precision and the maximum amount of formal, symbolic aid. Indeed, the occasional page packed with little but probability matrices, set theory, and the like makes for slow and somewhat typographically intimidating reading. Yet in Nozick’s hands these tools are well used, and offer to the patient reader both clarity and convincingness to a degree not likely to be available in another format. In fact, I think the formal essays offer the further advantage of being relatively self-contained, and thus fully accessible to anyone with sufficient education to read them. In contrast, some of the less formal work relies on the reader having a great deal of philosophical education and experience. Here to be capable of reading the essay is not sufficient for understanding it; one must also have read a good deal of Quine, and maybe some Hilary Putnam and B. F. Skinner just to be sure. For this reason, the audience for these essays must range, too. I can imagine having great fun reading “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice” with a group of smart undergraduates, and certainly advanced students in the social sciences, with little philosophical training, could profitably work their way through “Coercion” and “Interpersonal Utility Theory,” but most of the book is clearly designed for a rather highly trained philosopher. From this perspective, the chief value of the collection is the convenience of having so much interesting work in one volume. Less book than encyclopedia, it will make a useful reference volume for the serious student of philosophy, a place to turn for guidance in unraveling some of the intricacies of codifying rational principles of choice.

The historical aim of this paper is to reveal some striking similarities in Wittgenstein's treatment of epistemic justification and Rousseau's treatment of political justification. The theoretical aim is to open up the possibility of an understanding of justification which requires neither the discovery of some fundamental ground for judgment nor the alienation of the judge from the community or practice to be justified. Against the prevailing tradition in which justification occurs by reflectively rooting the practice in question in some unquestioned ground outside of and unaffected by that practice, a process which requires of the judge that her reason be untainted by practical involvements, both thinkers assert that justification can take place only within, being practically engaged with, whatever is to be justified. Indeed, we can go so far as to say for these thinkers that practical involvement is precisely the production of the grounds of legitimacy, and reasoned judgment is possible only from this engaged perspective. Key Words: justification • language • Rousseau • social contract • Wittgenstein.

"Content and Comportment argues persuasively that the answer to some long-standing questions in epistemology and metaphysics lies in taking up the neglected question of the role of our bodily activity in establishing connections between representational states—knowledge and belief in particular—and their objects in the world. It takes up these ideas from both current mainstream analytic philosophy—Frege, Dummett, Davidson, Evans—and from mainstream continental work—Heidegger and his commentators and critics—and bings them together successfully in a way that should surprise only those who persist in maintaining this barren dichotymization of the field."