•  1714
    This paper investigates Kant’s account of “real essence” and of a thing’s “nature”. Notwithstanding their wide negligence in the literature, these concepts belong to the central ones of Kant’s metaphysics. I argue that, on the one hand, Kant is in continuity with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of essence. But, on the other hand, he also follows Locke in distinguishing between “logical” and “real” essence. Contrary to recent attempts of aligning real essence with contemporary approaches to…Read more
  •  929
    Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” has always puzzled interpreters. On the one hand, he says that the transcendental object is the object to which we relate our representations. On the other hand, he declares the transcendental object to be unknowable and identifies it with the thing in itself. I argue that this poses a problem that Kant only in the B edition of the Critique solves in a satisfactory manner. According to this solution, we ascribe sensible predicates to things in thems…Read more
  •  546
    Kant’s postulate of possibility states that possible is whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience. As has often been noted, this is a definition of real possibility. However, little attention has been paid to the relation of Kantian real possibility to the German philosophical tradition before him. I discuss three kinds of possibility present in this tradition – internal, external, and (Crusian) real possibility – and argue that Kant endorses internal and external possibility. Fur…Read more
  •  290
    This paper proposes a novel reading of Kant’s account of the dependence of possibility on God in the pre-Critical Beweisgrund. I argue that Kant has a theistic-potentialist conception of the way God grounds possibility, according to which God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. The reason is that Kant accepts what I call the Principle of Possible Existence: If something is possible, then it is possible that it exists. Furthermore, I explore the connection between causal powers and…Read more
  •  205
    In the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, a textual stalemate between two camps has evolved: two-world interpretations regard things in themselves and appearances as two numerically distinct entities, whereas two-aspect interpretations take this distinction as one between two aspects of the same thing. I try to develop an account which can overcome this dispute. On the one hand, things in themselves are numerically distinct from appearances, but on the other hand, things in themse…Read more
  •  58
    Kant and Crusius on Causal Chains
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1): 107-128. 2019.
    There are two rival models on how to interpret causal chains in Kant. Traditional event-event models take it that events are causes of events, which are in turn causes of other events. Watkins’s causal powers interpretation, on the contrary, has it that substances have unchangeable grounds, and the series of events is only a series within the effect. By comparing Kant to Crusius, I argue that, to some extent, both approaches can be combined. For the powers of substances are made active by other …Read more
  •  58
    Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100 (2): 172-201. 2018.
    This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but h…Read more
  •  54
    The so-called ‘possibility proof’ in Kant's pre-CriticalBeweisgrundhas been widely discussed in the literature, and it is a common view that he never really abandoned it. As I shall argue, this reading is mistaken. I aim to show that the natural illusion in theCritique of Pure Reason, which is usually taken to be the possibility proof turned into a transcendental illusion, has both a different conclusion and a different argument than the possibility proof. Rather, what remains fromBeweisgrundis …Read more
  •  43
    Kant assents to Leibniz’s claim that purely positive concepts cannot contradict each other. Albeit counter-intuitive, this claim is well-grounded in Kant’s views on contradiction and conceptual content. First, according to Kant, a contradiction only occurs if a predicate is affirmed and negated; second, all concepts except of those that pertain to God covertly contain negative marks. Although I shall argue that Kant’s account fails, it is still interesting in that it tackles an overlooked proble…Read more
  •  36
    Kant on Universals
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (4): 335-352. 2015.
    Considering the large extent to which Kant deals with other metaphysical topics such as substances, causes, forces, and the like, he says surprisingly little about universals. By "universals," I am referring to the contemporary conception of universals, according to which...
  •  28
    Kant über Substanzen in der Erscheinung
    Kant Studien 108 (1): 1-18. 2017.
    There is a disagreement in Kant scholarship concerning the question whether phenomenal substance contains a substantial that is the first subject of all accidents and relations. I would like to argue in this paper that the disagreement stems from the overlooking of a development of Kant’s views. Having abandoned his Physical Monadology, Kant first rejected the substantiality of matter because of its infinite divisibility. But in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science his view is that ma…Read more
  •  8
    Kant on Real Grounds and Grounds of Being
    In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress, De Gruyter. pp. 591-598. 2021.
  •  4
    Many passages in Kant’s texts suggest that he is a phenomenalist about appearances, i.e., that appearances are only part of our mental content and do not exist outside our mind. In recent years, however, phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism have been of ill repute. Without wanting to make a positive case for phenomenalism, this paper attempts to rebut three particularly popular objections to any phenomenalist reading. In slogan form, they are 1) «There is only prima facie evidence», 2) «Kan…Read more
  •  4
    Analytische Erkenntnis der Dinge an sich – das Beispiel der einfachen Teile
    In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 1331-1340. 2018.
  • Kant on Real Grounds and Grounds of Being
    In Beatrix Himmelmann & Camilla Serck-Hanssen (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress, De Gruyter. pp. 585-595. 2021.
    In recent years, some scholars have argued that Kant embraces a theory of “real grounds” that is akin to contemporary accounts of grounding. In their view, Kantian real grounds are ‘explanatory’ grounds, and (real) grounding is an ontological dependence relation. Whilst they acknowledge causality as the paradigmatic case of grounding, these readers think that causality is by no means the only one. Other examples allegedly include mathematical grounding, grounds of possibility, substance-accident…Read more
  • Analytische Erkenntnis der Dinge an sich: das Beispiel der einfachen Teile
    In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 1331-1339. 2018.
    Dinge an sich sind unerkennbar. So lernen wir es in den Proseminaren; und dieser Eindruck ist auch beinahe unvermeidbar,wenn man die Kritik der reinen Vernunft zum ersten Mal liest. Doch bei einem genaueren Blick drängen sich Zweifel auf: Sind Dinge an sich wirklich absolut unerkennbar? Denn Kant macht darüber hinaus auch Aussagen über Eigenschaften von Dingen an sich, die ihnen...