Michael Robinson

ABSTRACTMetaphors frequently link negative affect with darkness and associations of this type have been established in several experimental paradigms. Given the ubiquity and strength of these associations, people who prefer dark to light may be more prone to negative emotional experiences and symptoms. A five study investigation couches these ideas in a new theoretical framework and then examines them. Across studies, 1 in 4 people preferred the perceptual concept of dark over the perceptual concept of light. These dark-preferring people scored higher in neuroticism and experienced greater depressive feelings in daily life. Moreover, dark preferences shared a robust relationship with depressive symptoms as well as generalised anxiety symptoms. The results provide novel insights into negative affectivity and extend conceptual metaphor theory in a way that is capable of making individual difference predictions.

ABSTRACTNegative feedback has paradoxical features to it. This form of feedback can have informational value under some circumstances, but it can also threaten the ego, potentially upsetting behaviour as a result. To investigate possible consequences of the latter type, two experiments presented positive or negative feedback within a sequence-prediction task that could not be solved. Following feedback, participants had to control their behaviours as effectively as possible in a motor control task. Relative to positive feedback, negative feedback undermined control in a manner suggesting emotional upset. These reactions lasted for at least three seconds and were especially pronounced among people reporting that they typically lose control in the context of their negative emotions. The findings document a novel form of behavioural dysregulation that occurs in response to negative feedback while also highlighting the utility of motor control perspectives on self...

Theories of neuroticism emphasise its close potential link to punishment-reactivity processes, yet cognitive sources of evidence for this proposed processing basis are surprisingly scarce. The present two studies (N = 123) sought to rectify this important gap in the literature in terms of reactivity to error feedback. Study 1 found that individuals high in neuroticism were faster to switch behavioural responses following errors, whereas an opposite pattern was found among individuals low in neuroticism. Study 2 extended this error-reactivity perspective to the realm of behavioural decision making. Individuals high in neuroticism switched their behavioural predictions following error feedback, whereas this tendency was non-significant among individuals low in neuroticism. Together, the studies present novel, but theory-informed, cognitive paradigms for assessing punishment-reactivity processes, confirm neuroticism's link to such processes, and do so in the realms of both reaction time (Study 1) and behavioural predictions (Study 2). The discussion focuses on the utility of modelling punishment-reactivity processes in cognitive terms and highlights relevant directions for future research.

Approach and avoidance motivation may represent important explanatory constructs in understanding how individuals differ. Such constructs have primarily been assessed in self-reported terms, but there are limitations to self-reports of motivation. Accordingly, the present review concentrates on the potential utility of implicit cognitive-behavioral probes of approach and avoidance motivation in modeling and understanding individual differences. The review summarizes multiple lines of research that have documented the utility of such probes to the personality-processing interface. Although multiple gaps in our knowledge exist, and are acknowledged, the value of such implicit cognitive-behavioral assessments is emphasized both in modeling multiple subcomponents of approach and avoidance motivation and in showing that such tendencies matter in ways that transcend momentary experiences or manipulations

Self-deception is an important construct in social, personality, and clinical literatures. Although historical and clinical views of self-deception have regarded it as defensive in nature and operation, modern views of this individual difference variable instead highlight its apparent benefits to subjective mental health. The present four studies reinforce the latter view by showing that self-deception predicts positive priming effects, but not negative priming effects, in reaction time tasks sensitive to individual differences in affective priming. In all studies, individuals higher in self-deception displayed stronger positive priming effects, defined in terms of facilitation with two positive stimuli in a consecutive sequence, but self-deception did not predict negative priming effects in the same tasks. Importantly, these effects occurred both in tasks that called for the retrieval of self-knowledge (Study 1) and those that did not (Studies 2–4). This broad pattern supports substantive views of self-deception rather than views narrowly focused on self-presentation processes. Implications for understanding self-deception are discussed.

How do daily life events impact the affective and cognitive components of well-being (WB)? Results from cross-sectional (Ns = 129 and 64) and longitudinal (N = 129) studies suggest that there is a parsimonious answer to this question. Life events are closely related to mood states, mood states are closely related to cognitive WB, and mood states appear to serve as the nexus through which changing life circumstances affect cognitive WB. These results are consistent with a mood-mediation model, which assumes that mood states perform several functions for the individual. As a reactive index, mood states provide a hedonic summary of recent life experiences. As a prospective index, mood states inform the individual about one's progress and prospects in important life domains. Together, the results indicate that affective experiences play a central role in linking daily life to cognitive representations of well-being.