• Jurisdiction and the Moral Impact Theory of Law
    Legal Theory 1-34. forthcoming.
    Positivists and interpretivists (Dworkinians) might accept that conceptual facts about the law—facts about the content of the concept of law—can obtain in the absence of communities with law practices. But they would deny that legal facts can obtain in such communities’ absence. Under the moral impact theory, by contrast, legal facts can precede all communities with law practices. I identify a set of legal facts in private international law—the law of jurisdiction—that concerns when a community'…Read more
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    ABSTRACT I have argued that Nietzsche was influenced by Afrikan Spir's falsification thesis, according to which all empirical judgments are false because they attempt to impose the necessity, unity, and timelessness of thought upon the contingency, plurality, and successiveness of sensations. My reading has been challenged by Nadeem Hussain, who claims that it ignores Spir's phenomenalism. For the phenomenalist, true judgments about sensations are possible. I argue here that Hussain reads Spir a…Read more
  •  35
    On Hart's category mistake
    Legal Theory 19 (4): 347-369. 2013.
    This essay concerns Scott Shapiro's criticism that H.L.A. Hart's theory of law suffers from a Although other philosophers of law have summarily dismissed Shapiro's criticism, I argue that it identifies an important requirement for an adequate theory of law. Such a theory must explain why legal officials justify their actions by reference to abstract propositional entities, instead of pointing to the existence of social practices. A virtue of Shapiro's planning theory of law is that it can explai…Read more
  •  16
    Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (1): 33-55. 2008.
    In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’, I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived his interpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theory of meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’. In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that he committed the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact that he considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—i…Read more
  •  2
    Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition
    University of Illinois Press. 2002.
    By tracking Nietsche's thought through the philosophical influences upon him, Green establishes a significant new foundation from which to assess Nietzsche's place in modern philosophy and culture.
  •  33
    White and Clark on Nietzsehe and The Transcendental Tradition
    International Studies in Philosophy 37 (3): 45-75. 2005.
  • The dissertation is an account of Nietzsche's denial of cognitive objectivity, that is, his denial that there can be such a thing as a true judgment. I claim that plausible arguments for denying cognitive objectivity can be found in Nietzsche, but only after some strong analogies between this denial and traditional arguments against evaluative objectivity are made apparent. Judgments of value are not considered objective because they are motivational, that is, because making an evaluative judgme…Read more
  •  87
    Nietzsche on Pity and Ressentiment
    International Studies in Philosophy 24 (2): 63-70. 1992.
  •  44
    Kelsen, Quietism, and the Rule of Recognition
    In Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth E. Himma (eds.), THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Sometimes the fact that something is the law can be justified by the law. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the law because it was enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause. But eventually legal justification of law ends. The ultimate criteria of validity in a legal system cannot themselves be justified by law. According to H.L.A. Hart, justification of these ultimate criteria is still available, by reference to social facts concerning official acceptance - facts about what Hart c…Read more
  •  27
    In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court is anticipated to finally decide whether the Second Amendment is an individual or a collective right. This article is not about the textual and historical arguments on the basis of which the Court is likely to make its decision. My topic is more fundamental. Assuming that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, what purpose does it serve? What are the possible reasons that private arms possession is sufficiently valuable to deserve …Read more
  •  15
    Eternal recurrence in a Neo-Kantian context
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 54 (128): 459-473. 2013.
    Neste ensaio, argumento que qualquer um que adotasse um falsificacionismo do tipo que tenho atribuído a Nietzsche se sentiria atraído pela doutrina do eterno retorno. Para Nietzsche, pensar o 'vir a ser' revelado por meio dos sentidos significa falsificá-lo por meio do 'ser'. Mas o eterno retorno oferece a possibilidade de pensar o 'vir a ser' sem falsificação. Em seguida, argumento que qualquer um que mantenha o falsificacionismo de Nietzsche veria na ação humana um conflito entre o 'ser' e o '…Read more
  •  20
    Nietzsche's place in nineteenth century German philosophy
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (2). 2004.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  20
    This article is a limited defense of copyrights for the contents of factual compilations. The form of protection that I propose, under which the collective factual content of such compilations is protected, differs from an approach that protects individual facts and from the currently accepted approach (as articulated in Feist v. Rural Telephone), under which only selections and arrangements of individual facts are protected. Although I accept that there are sound economic justifications for ref…Read more
  •  54
    Leiter on the Legal Realists
    Law and Philosophy 30 (4): 381-418. 2011.
    In this essay reviewing Brian Leiter’s recent book Naturalizing Jurisprudence, I focus on two positions that distinguish Leiter’s reading of the American legal realists from those offered in the past. The first is his claim that the realists thought the law is only locally indeterminate – primarily in cases that are appealed. The second is his claim that they did not offer a prediction theory of law, but were instead committed to a standard positivist theory. Leiter’s reading is vulnerable, beca…Read more