Michael Spezio

What are the biological bases of religious experience? Are there biological constraints upon or determinants of religious narratives and practices? How does understanding the biology of religious experience inform the ongoing reconstruction of religious rituals and myths? In The Mystical Mind, Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg address these central questions and others from a distinct perspective called biogenetic structuralism. They propose a model of how brain activity gives rise to mystical experiential states, examine how neurobiological responses to rhythmic behavior form religious ritual, and point toward the development of a megatheology, or a theological system appealing to the widest scope of religious world‐views. This paper is a critical review of d’Aquili and Newberg's exciting work.

What are the biological bases of religious experience? Are there biological constraints upon or determinants of religious narratives and practices? How does understanding the biology of religious experience inform the ongoing reconstruction of religious rituals and myths? In The Mystical Mind, Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg address these central questions and others from a distinct perspective called biogenetic structuralism. They propose a model of how brain activity gives rise to mystical experiential states, examine how neurobiological responses to rhythmic behavior form religious ritual, and point toward the development of a megatheology, or a theological system appealing to the widest scope of religious world‐views. This paper is a critical review of d’Aquili and Newberg's exciting work.

After providing a brief overview of social neuroscience in the context of strong embodiment and the cognitive sciences, this paper addresses how perspectives from the field may inform how theological anthropology approaches the origins of human persons-in-community. An overview of the Social Brain Hypothesis and of simulation theory reveals a simultaneous potential for receptive/projective processes to facilitate social engagement and the need for intentional spontaneity in the form of a spiritual formation that moves beyond simulation to empathy and love. Finally, elements of a virtue science that draws on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's relational imago Dei are shown to be helpful in framing and motivating theological approaches to human origins

. In Minding God Gregory Peterson takes a careful look at the kind of freedom that human persons have. He concludes that humans are constrained to be free and unpacks this into a version of compatibilism. That is, humans are not metaphysically free under current existence because of the causal determination inherent in their physical nature, but they can take credit for the origination of selfforming decisions because the causes occur inside of us. Peterson does advocate an eschatological hope looking forward to the breaking of causal determination by God's own action. Thus, Minding God presents an eschatologically limited compatibilism. Compatibilism of any kind, however, presents serious challenges to most Christian theologies and to many religious traditions broadly considered. After I interpret Peterson's position I make the argument that compatibilism is neither desirable nor required for a theological anthropology intent on serious engagement of cognitive science

. In Minding God Gregory Peterson takes a careful look at the kind of freedom that human persons have. He concludes that humans are constrained to be free and unpacks this into a version of compatibilism. That is, humans are not metaphysically free under current existence because of the causal determination inherent in their physical nature, but they can take credit for the origination of selfforming decisions because the causes occur inside of us. Peterson does advocate an eschatological hope looking forward to the breaking of causal determination by God's own action. Thus, Minding God presents an eschatologically limited compatibilism. Compatibilism of any kind, however, presents serious challenges to most Christian theologies and to many religious traditions broadly considered. After I interpret Peterson's position I make the argument that compatibilism is neither desirable nor required for a theological anthropology intent on serious engagement of cognitive science.