•  136
  •  67
  •  33
    Anxious Insects
    The Philosophers' Magazine 76 90-95. 2017.
  •  112
    Causal Roles and Higher-Order PropertiesTen Problems of Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 657. 1998.
    I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that …Read more
  •  96
    Vagueness and Reality
    Philosophical Topics 28 (1): 195-209. 2000.
  •  11
    Shoemaker's The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 461-464. 2000.
    This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the “first-person perspective.” The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking.
  •  45
    Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 968-971. 1997.
  •  22
    I–Michael Tye
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1): 77-94. 1998.
  •  39
  •  103
    Externalism and Memory
    with Jane Heal
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (72): 77-109. 1998.
    [Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certa…Read more
  •  27
    Filling In and the Nature of Visual Experience
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 59-69. 2020.
    This essay begins with a discussion of the phenomenon of filling in. It is argued that filling in is naturally accounted for by taking visual experiences to be importantly like drawn pictures of the world outside. An alternative proposal is then considered, one that models visual experiences on incomplete descriptions. It is shown that introspection does not favor the pictorial view. It is also shown that the phenomenon of blurriness in visual experience does not provide a good reason for favori…Read more
  •  26
    Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2): 336-339. 1986.
  •  102
    Two Cheers for RepresentationalismTen Problems of Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 671. 1998.
  •  62
    Book reviews (review)
    with N. C. A. Costa, David Harrah, D. S. Clarke, Jeffrey Olen, Robert Young, Richard Campbell, Michael McKinsey, John Peterson, Alex C. Michalos, John Glucker, John T. Blackmore, Eileen Bagus, and Barbara Goodwin
    Philosophia 15 (1-2): 279-281. 1985.
  •  14
    Richard Arneson University of California, San Diego Alison Leigh Brown Northern Arizona University
    with John Carriero, Michael Ferejohn, Michael Jubien, Philip Kain, Kwong-Loi Shun, David W. Smith, Julie Van Camp, and Georgia Warnke
    Philosophical Studies 99 (1). 2000.
  •  62
    The two dominant theories of consciousness argue it appeared in living beings either suddenly, or gradually. Both theories face problems. The solution is the realization that a foundational consciousness was always here, yet varying conscious states were not, and appeared gradually. Michael Tye explores this idea and the key questions it raises.
  •  1
    Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1): 163-183. 1988.
  •  37
    Filling In and the Nature of Visual Experience
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 59-69. 2020.
    This essay begins with a discussion of the phenomenon of filling in. It is argued that filling in is naturally accounted for by taking visual experiences to be importantly like drawn pictures of the world outside. An alternative proposal is then considered, one that models visual experiences on incomplete descriptions. It is shown that introspection does not favor the pictorial view. It is also shown that the phenomenon of blurriness in visual experience does not provide a good reason for favori…Read more
  •  151
    Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves
    with Peter Bradly
    Journal of Philosophy 98 (9): 469. 2001.
    According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous …Read more
  •  12
    Material Beings (review)
    Philosophical Review 101 (4): 881-884. 1992.
  •  36
    The Metaphysics of Mind
    Philosophical Review 101 (4): 908. 1992.
  •  10
    Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2): 347-350. 1987.
  •  4
    The truth about true blue
    Analysis 66 (292): 340-344. 2006.
  •  924
    What Acquaintance Teaches
    In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2019.
    In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object-knowledge rather than propositional-knowledge. To know what it is like one must know an appropriate propositional…Read more
  •  3
    Response to DiscussantsTen Problems of Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 679. 1998.
  •  70
    Are Pains Feelings?
    The Monist 100 (4): 478-484. 2017.
    This essay defends the view that pain is a feeling, and thus that token pains are instances of feeling, against a number of objections.
  •  3
    The Metaphysics of Mind
    Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159): 255-257. 1990.