113Following logical realism where it leadsPhilosophical Studies 176 (1): 117-139. 2019.Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.
83Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of LogicPhilosophy Compass 14 (1). 2019.
71An Introduction to Metametaphysics by Tuomas E. Tahko: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. v + 258, £19.99 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4): 832-833. 2017.
48An Epistemic Account Of Metaphysical Equivalence1Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1): 270-293. 2017.I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a way to rule out th…Read more
Boston UniversityDepartment of PhilosophyAssistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest