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605The Unconscious, consciousness, and the Self illusionDialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 6 (1): 10-22. 2013.In this article we explore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive science - meaning by this term the mature cognitive science, which has fully incorporated the results of the neurosciences. In this framework we first compare the neurocognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, emphasizing the similarities and above all the differences between the two constructs. We then turn our attention to the implications of the centrali…Read more
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49Coscienza e soggettività. La scienza cognitiva ha eliminato le persone?Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 403-420. 2013.Some philosophers and cognitive scientists think that a naturalised philosophy of the (self-) conscious mind should lead us to reject the very existence of the self. The paper focuses on two case-studies which are representative of this kind of attitude. In particular we examine, and criticise, Thomas Metzinger's 'no-self alternative' and Daniel Dennett's narrative elimination of the self. Our aim is not to prove that any elimination of the self from the inventory of the world based on the empir…Read more
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294 Two Varieties of Causal EmergentismIn Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy, Routledge. pp. 64. 2010.
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23Overcoming the Past-endorsement Criterion: Toward a Transparency-Based Mark of the MentalFrontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called “cognitive bloat”, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a “weak conscientialist” mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, however, ident…Read more
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21Explanation, Emergence and Causality: Comments on CraneIn Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford University Press. 2010.Tim Crane's ‘Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap’ claims that non‐reductive physicalism must either close the explanatory gap, addressing the challenge famously posed by Levine's argument, or become identical to emergentism. Since no way to close the gap is available, the result is that there can be no interesting philosophical position intermediate between physicalism and emergentism. This chapter argues that if we look at the relation between physicalism and…Read more
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20The End of the World? Mental Causation, Explanation and MetaphysicsHumana Mente 8 (29). 2015.In this paper we offer some ideas on the relationship between metaphysics of causation and common explanatory practices of behaviour. We first suggest a sort of “negotiating model” for theorizing about mental causation, and then examine the so-called causal closure argument focusing on some morals one can draw from it that further illustrate the model we recommend.
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19Mind and Causality a cura di Alberto PeruzziIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 18 (3): 623-638. 2005.
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11Russell, l'idealismo e l'origine della filosofia analiticaRivista di Storia Della Filosofia 47 (4): 761. 1992.
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7Analogies, Non-reductionism and IllusionsRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6 (3): 480-485. 2015.This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini’s paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Car…Read more
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5Book reviews (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2): 221-263. 1993.Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without foundationalism: A case for second-order logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. xvii + 277 pp. £35.00 A. Diaz, J, Echeverria and A. Ibarra, Structures in...
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5La mente estesa: dove finisce la mente e comincia il resto del mondo? (edited book)Mondadori università. 2012.
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3Il realismo analitico: logica, ontologia e significato nel primo RussellGuerini e associati. 1991.
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1Book reviews (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (2): 221-263. 1993.Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without foundationalism: A case for second-order logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. xvii + 277 pp. £35.00 A. Diaz, J, Echeverria and A. Ibarra, Structures in...
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Alle origini Della filosofia analitica: Il realismo proposizionale Del primo RussellEpistemologia 18 (1): 3-26. 1995.
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The self and its defences.Palgrave-Macmillan. 2016.In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative…Read more
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Aspetti del problema dei nomi propri in Frege e RussellACME: Annali della Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell'Università degli studi di Milano 35 (1): 49-66. 1982.
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Russell su significato e denotazione. I manoscritti pre-"On Denoting"Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 46 (2): 321. 1991.
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Aa. Vv., "Antinomies and Paradoxes. Studies in Russel's Early Philosophy" (review)Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 46 (4): 806. 1991.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |