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The Content of Perceptual ExperienceIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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What kind of awareness is awareness of awarenessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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What kind of awareness is awareness of awarenessIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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42Brentano's theory of intentionalityEuropean Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 445-454. 2023.Chapters Five through Nine of Book Two of Brentano's 1874 Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint were republished in 1911 with a substantive Appendix of Brentano's remarks. In the Appendix Brentano makes a significant addition to his theory of intentionality. In particular, he introduces new modes within the mode of presentation itself. These new modes are needed to account for our thinking about anything in a relational structure (in recto and in obliquo modes) and for our thoughts about time …Read more
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82The phenomenology of particularityIn Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 121--140. 2011.
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243Cognitive Phenomenology (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2011.Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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145The sense/cognition distinctionInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2): 229-245. 2023.Many contemporary philosophers have been concerned about whether there is a fundamental distinction between perception and cognition. Although I do not think there is a fundamental distinction between perception and cognition, at least given what I take perception to be, I do think there is a fundamental distinction between sense and cognition, which I will argue is best understood in terms of a distinction between two irreducible kinds of phenomenology: sensory and cognitive.
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3The Content of Perceptual ExperienceIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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92A response to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The GivenPhilosophical Psychology 30 (7): 1013-1017. 2017.In this paper I respond to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The Given, focusing on their criticisms of the awareness of awareness thesis.
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286What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3): 359-380. 2017._ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awarene…Read more
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199Perception and cognitive phenomenologyPhilosophical Studies 174 (8): 2045-2062. 2017.In this paper I consider the uses to which certain psychological phenomena—e.g. cases of seeing as, and linguistic understanding—are put in the debate about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that we need clear definitions of the terms ‘sensory phenomenology’ and ‘cognitive phenomenology’ in order to understand the import of these phenomena. I make a suggestion about the best way to define these key terms, and, in the light of it, show how one influential argument against cognitive phenomenology f…Read more
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346Against propositionalismNoûs 41 (3). 2007.'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague am…Read more
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83Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, and Value and Brentano’s MindPhilosophical Review 129 (3): 473-480. 2020.
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534The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotionPhilosophical Studies 145 (2): 171-192. 2009.My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognit…Read more
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877Non-propositional intentionality: an introductionIn Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality, Oxford University Press. 2018.Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent the world. This book expl…Read more
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26The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of ExperienceIn Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Ontos Verlag. pp. 73-88. 2012.
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78A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of EmotionThe Monist 100 (1): 64-87. 2017.In this paper I consider Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano’s arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that ‘feeling and will’ are united into the …Read more
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90Non-Propositional Intentionality (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.This book explores how our minds represent things in the world, asking whether these representations necessarily have the structure of propositions about the world. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of the puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world.
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174Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thoughtPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2): 167-181. 2016.How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as conscious thought. So one must either accept t…Read more
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46The metaphysics & phenomenology of perceptual experience: A reply to ConductConsciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 737-739. 2012.
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Brentano on Emotion and the WillIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, Routledge. pp. 110-123. 2017.Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion is tightly bound up with many of his other central claims, in such a way that one has to work out how it relates to these other claims if one is to understand its distinctive character. There are two main axes of investigation. The first results from the fact that Brentano introduces his theory of emotion as part of his overall theory of mind, which consists of a number of closely interconnected theses concerning the nature of mental phenomena, the nature of co…Read more
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IntentionalityIn Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Sage Publications. 2013.
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132Recent work: Recent work on intentionalityAnalysis 70 (4). 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation).
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