Miguel Martí

After summarising the evolution of Franz Brentano’s personal thought on time, this paper discusses his work in historical order to see his presentation of Aristotle’s philosophy of time, with particular regard to his unpublished manuscripts. Although he tends to view Aristotle’s idea of time as a mere relation of the changing thing to the celestial rotation, mainly the first sphere, at the end of his life, Brentano assimilates Aristotle’s conception of time more closely to his own personal account of time, which is linked to psychic phenomena and the flow of consciousness.

In the Metaphysics, especially in Book X, are drawn the general lines of a henology. For the proper understanding of this doctrine it is necessary to reconstruct its argumentation from two fundamental basis: (1) the guide of puzzles or aporias that book III provides and (2) the ontological project announced in book IV where the relationship between ontology and henology is indicated. The fundamental feature of Aristotle's henology is that is a subordinate part of ontology. The role of henology is for Aristotle primarily destructive, that is, with this doctrine it is intended to establish the impossibility of considering the ‘one’ (τὸ ἓν) as a principle of the entities.