Durham University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2015
Azusa, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
  • Selfhood, Autism and Thought Insertion (edited book)
    Imprint Academic. 2021.
    This book presents engaging and informative analysis of three interrelated notions, namely: selfhood, the first person pronoun ‘I’ and the first person perspective. Philosophers have long debated about these notions on non-empirical grounds often focusing on the question of whether the first person pronoun ‘I’, beyond its role as a grammatical term, has an underlying implication for the ontology of selfhood. Philosophers continuously grapple with whether the first person pronoun ‘I’ is a referri…Read more
  •  64
    E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics and Analytic Theology. Special Issue edited by Mihretu P. Guta and Eric LaRock.
    with Mihretu P. Guta and Eric LaRock
    TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology. forthcoming.
    The essays in this special issue focus on connecting the relevant aspects of Lowe’s work to any issue in philosophical theology or philosophy of religion, especially incarnation, trinity, divine attributes, human agency and divine sovereignty, unified experience and the existence of God, divine causation, divine temporality or atemporality et cetera.
  •  52
    Physically Sufficient Neural Mechanisms of Consciousness
    Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 13 (24): 1-14. 2019.
    Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC) are foundational to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers (2000) has provided the most informative and influential definition of NCC, according to which neural correlates are minimally sufficient for consciousness. However, the sense of sufficiency needs further clarification since there are several relevant senses with different entailments. In section one of this article, we give an overview of the desiderata for a good definition …Read more
  • In this paper, I will give a three-stage analysis of the origin of phenomenal consciousness. The first one has to do with a non-causal stage. The second one has to do with a causal stage. The third one has to do with a correlation stage. This paper is divided into three sections. In section I, I will discuss a non-causal stage which focuses on finite consciousness as an irreducible emergent property—i.e., a simple non-structural property that is unique to the “emergent” level of reality. I will …Read more
  • Jehovah’s Witnesses
    In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), Encyclopedia of Christianity in the Global South, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 415-417. 2018.
  •  9
    This book aims to show the centrality of a proper ontology of properties in thinking about consciousness. Philosophers have long grappled with what is now known as the hard problem of consciousness, i.e., how can subjective or qualitative features of our experience—such as how a strawberry tastes—arise from brain states? More recently, philosophers have incorporated what seems like promising empirical research from neuroscience and cognitive psychology in an attempt to bridge the gap betwe…Read more
  •  10
    The Two Natures of the Incarnate Christ and the Bearer Question.
    TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 3 (1): 113-143. 2019.
    The Chalcedonian Definition states that the incarnate Christ is both fully human and fully divine. But spelling out what the Chalcedonian Definition entails continues to be a subject of intense controversy among philosophers and theologians alike. One of these controversies concerns what I call the problem of the bearer question. At the heart of this question lies whether or not the two natures of Christ require two distinct bearers. In section I, I will explain the problem of the bearer questio…Read more
  • Zoroastrianism and Christianity
    In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), Encyclopedia of Christianity in the Global South, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 879-881. 2018.
  •  49
    The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by Gabriele Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux
  •  316
    Obituary for Professor E.J. Lowe
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 159-162. 2014.
  •  9
    Consciousness, First-Person Perspective, and Neuroimaging
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12): 218-245. 2015.
    In this paper, my main goal is to discuss two incompatible answers proposed to what I shall call, the objectivity seeking question (OSQ). The first answer is what I shall call the primacy thesis, according to which the third-person perspective is superior to that of the first-person perspective. Ultimately I will reject this answer. The second answer is what I shall call the skepticism thesis, according to which the distinction between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspectiv…Read more
  •  636
    The goal of this paper is to critically examine the objections of John Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of substance or substratum. Locke argues in Essay that substratum is the bearer of the properties of a particular substance. Locke also claims that we have no knowledge of substratum. But Locke’s claim about our ignorance as to what substratum is, is contentious. That is, if we don’t know what substratum is, then what is the point of proposing it as a bearer of properties? This questi…Read more
  •  66
    Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? (review)
    Analysis 74 (2): 356-357. 2014.
    Edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
  •  33
    The essays in this volume focus on the notion of the first-person pro-noun ‘I’, the notion of the self or person,1 and the notion of the first-person perspective. Let us call these the three notions. Ever since Descartes set the initial tone in his Meditations, modern philosophical controversies concerning the three notions have continued unabated. Part of the reason for ongoing debates has to do with the sorts of questions that the three notions give rise to.
  • Neuroscience or Neuroscientism? ’A Response to Paul Moes and D. Gareth Jones‘
    Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 63 (1): 69-70. 2011.
  •  2
    Frank Jackson's Location Problem and Argument from the Self
    Philosophia Christi 1 (13): 35-58. 2011.
    E. J. Lowe argues in Personal Agency that the self is physically embodied yet not identical with any physical body, nor with any part of a physical body, such as the brain. For Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of carrying out intentional actions. Call this the thesis about the self (TS). In this paper my purpose is to develop and defend TS and argue that Frank Jackson’s serious metaphysics (SM) fails to account for the nature of the self. This paper is outlined as follows: Section I pr…Read more
  • Objects, Dispositions and Lockean Person-Making Properties.
    APPRAISAL The Journal of the British Personalist Forum 11 (1 Boston Issue). 2016.
    This paper examines certain influential contemporary philosophical analyses of the notion of a person and show why they are misguided. Inspired by the Lockean conception of a person, some philosophers claim that personhood must be attributed only to those human beings who can meet certain criteria required for it. Here the views of Tooley, Dennett and Singer will be discussed against the backdrop of the metaphysics of powers ontology as advocated by contemporary philosophers: C. B. Martin, John …Read more
  • How Far Can Science Take US? A Response to Craig M. Story
    Journal of American Scientific Affliation 62 (2): 143-144. 2010.