Purdue University
Department of Philosophy
PhD
Joliet, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
  •  289
    'Partial defeaters' and the epistemology of disagreement
    Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239): 355-372. 2010.
    Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not all, o…Read more
  •  241
    Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement
    Philosophy Compass 5 (8): 712-724. 2010.
    Consider two people who disagree about some important claim (e.g. the future moral and political consequences of current U.S. economic policy are X). They each believe the other person is in possession of relevant evidence, is roughly equally competent to evaluate that evidence, etc. From the epistemic point of view, how should such recognized disagreement affect their doxastic attitude toward the original claim? Recent research on the epistemology of disagreement has converged upon three genera…Read more
  •  214
    Alvin Plantinga and other philosophers have argued that exclusive religious belief can be rationally held in response to certain experiences – independently of inference to other beliefs, evidence, arguments, and the like – and thus can be 'properly basic'. We think that this is possible only until the believer acquires the defeater we develop in this paper, a defeater which arises from an awareness of certain salient features of religious pluralism. We argue that, as a consequence of this defea…Read more
  •  77
    A Molinist-Style Response to Schellenberg
    Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1): 33-41. 2006.
  •  15
    Naturalism, Hope, and Alethic Rationality
    Philo 9 (1): 5-11. 2006.
    In my “Plantinga Untouched,” I argued that James Beilby’s recent objection to Plantinga’s EAAN was unsuccessful. Beilby has sincereplied that a naturalist can grant the Inscrutability Thesis and yet be alethically rational in hoping for a high P(R/N and future developments of E) and, therefore, needn’t accept the alethic defeater for R. I argue that this is impossible, since a naturalist cannot consistently grant that thesis and meet Beilby’s own criteria for alethic hope. Consequently, Planting…Read more
  •  11
    Disagreement, by Bryan Frances (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 38 (4): 485-488. 2015.
  •  5
    In my "Plantinga Untouched: A Response to Beilby on the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism" (Philosophia Christi 7:1 [2005], pp. 157-67), I argue that James Beilby's (2003) objection to Alvin Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism" (EAAN) is unsuccessful. Along the way, I argue that the move to grant Plantinga's 'inscrutability thesis' - namely, that the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism and evolutionary theory [P(R/N&E)], is low or ins…Read more
  •  4