•  6
    The Practices of Forgiving: Replies
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3): 336-345. 2019.
  •  25
    Forgiveness—An Ordered Pluralism
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3): 241-260. 2019.
    ABSTRACT There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoin…Read more
  •  50
    Bernard Williams as a Philosopher of Ethical Freedom
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8): 919-933. 2020.
    Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if…Read more
  •  11
    Miranda Fricker on McDowell (review)
    Women’s Philosophy Review 18 93-94. 1998.
  •  3
    Pragmatism and Feminism-Reweaving the Social Fabric, Charlene Haddock Seigfried (review)
    Women’s Philosophy Review 17 33-34. 1997.
  • Can There Be Institutional Virtues
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3. 2010.
  •  87
    The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique. Axel Honneth’s rich account focuses our attention on recognition’s role in securing basic self-confidence, moral self-respect, and self-esteem. With these loci of recognition in place, we are enabled to raise the intriguing question whether each of these may be extended to apply specifically to the epistemic dim…Read more
  •  11
    Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the…Read more
  •  22
    Why 'Female Intuition'?
    Women’s Philosophy Review 15 36-44. 1996.
  •  7
    Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science (review)
    Women’s Philosophy Review 12 26-27. 1994.
  •  67
    The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (edited book)
    with Peter Graham, David Henderson, and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen
    Routledge. 2019.
  •  108
    Ambivalence About Forgiveness
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 161-185. 2018.
    Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological me…Read more
  •  51
    Editorial
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1): 1-1. 2018.
  •  56
    FORUM: Miranda FRICKER’s Epistemic Injustice. Power and the Ethics of Knowing
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 23 (1): 69-71. 2008.
    This paper summarizes key themes from my Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ; and it gives replies to commentators.
  •  142
    Replies to critics
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 23 (1): 81-86. 2008.
    Replies.
  •  312
    I—Miranda Fricker: The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 151-177. 2010.
    Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lig…Read more
  •  116
    Beyond Moral Judgment, by Alice Crary
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2): 311-315. 2010.
  •  4
    Review. Feminism & science . Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen E Longino (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4): 618-620. 1997.
  •  463
    In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also h…Read more
  •  50
    This chapter focuses on the different styles of moral relativism. The history of moral relativist thinking features different branches to the family tree, each representing a different impetus to relativism, and so producing a different style of moral relativist thought. At the root, however, is a broadly subjectivist parent idea that morality is at least in part the upshot of a shared way of life, and shared ways of life tend to vary markedly from culture to culture. The discussions cover the b…Read more
  •  388
    Rational authority and social power: Towards a truly social epistemology
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2). 1998.
    This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, …Read more
  •  602
    Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?
    Synthese 190 (7): 1317-1332. 2013.
    I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political signif…Read more
  •  90
    Philosopher's zone
    with Alan Saunders
    In London in 1993, a black teenager named Stephen Lawrence was fatally stabbed by a small gang of white teenagers. His friend Duwayne Brooks was a witness but the police failed to take his testimony seriously. When someone speaks but is not heard because of accent, sex, or colour, that person is undermined as a knower. This week, we look at was it means to do justice to someone's status as a knower.
  •  51
    Review of Feminism and Science (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4): 618-620. 1997.
  •  18
    Powerlessness and Social Interpretation
    Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1): 96-108. 2006.
  •  1
    1. institutionalized groups—three aspects
    In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 3--235. 2010.
  •  63
    10. Can There Be Institutional Virtues?
    In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 3--235. 2010.
  •  199
    The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2000.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of …Read more
  •  9
    Reason and emotion
    Radical Philosophy 57 (Spring): 14-19. 1991.