•  21
    Education, epistemic justice, and truthfulness: Miranda Fricker interviewed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson
    with A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 (4-5): 791-802. 2024.
    In her groundbreaking book, Epistemic Injustice, renowned moral philosopher and social epistemologist Miranda Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice to draw attention to the pervasive impact of epistemic oppression on marginalized social groups. Fricker’s account spurred a flurry of scholarship regarding the discriminatory impact of epistemic injustice and gave birth to a domain of philosophical inquiry that has extended far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. In this intervie…Read more
  •  52
    The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2016.
    Groups engage in epistemic activity all the time--whether it be the active collective inquiry of scientific research groups or crime detection units, or the evidential deliberations of tribunals and juries, or the informational efforts of the voting population in general--and yet in philosophy there is still relatively little epistemology of groups to help explore these epistemic practices and their various dimensions of social and philosophical significance. The aim of this book is to address t…Read more
  •  50
    Think Interview: Epistemic Injustice
    Think 22 (64): 15-21. 2023.
    Over the centuries, many philosophers have written about injustice. More recently, attention has turned to a previously little-recognized form of injustice – epistemic injustice. The philosopher Miranda Fricker coined the phrase ‘epistemic injustice’ – an example being when your credibility as a source of knowledge is unjustly downgraded (perhaps because you are ‘just a woman’ of the ‘wrong’ race). This interview with Miranda explores what epistemic injustice is, and why it is important.
  •  11
    Die Entwicklung von Konzepten der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit
    In Sebastian Schleidgen, Orsolya Friedrich & Andreas Wolkenstein (eds.), Bedeutung und Implikationen epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit, Tectum – Ein Verlag in Der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. pp. 15-30. 2023.
  •  3
    Philosophy and Feminism
    with Jean Grimshaw
    In Nicholas Bunnin & E. P. Tsui‐James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Blackwell. 2002.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Feminism and Philosophy: Introduction Philosophy and Masculinity Dichotomies: Derrida and Feminism Feminism and Philosophy Feminism in Philosophy: Two Conceptions Philosophical Commitments.
  •  17
    Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 722-742. 2023.
    I consider Katherine Hawley's commitment account of interpersonal trustworthiness alongside her sceptical challenge regarding the value of philosophically modelling institutional trustworthiness as distinct from reliability. I argue, pace Hawley's challenge, that there would be significant diagnostic and explanatory loss if we were to content ourselves with ideas of institutional (un)reliability alone; and I offer an illustrative case where institutional unreliability is only the half of it, ind…Read more
  •  1
    Schweigen und institutionelle Vorurteile
    In Hilge Landweer, Catherine Newmark, Christine Kley & Simone Miller (eds.), Philosophie und die Potenziale der Gender Studies, Transcript. pp. 63-86. 2012.
  •  111
    Whose morality is it anyway?
    with Simon Blackburn, A. C. Grayling, Anthony O’Hear, and Bhikhu Parekh
    The Philosophers' Magazine 30 41-49. 2005.
  •  1
    Testimonial injustice
    In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology, Wiley. 2019.
  •  24
    Conceptos de injusticia epistémica en evolución
    Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 10 (19): 97-104. 2021.
    Este texto es la traducción del capítulo cuarto de The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, editado por Ian James Kidd, José Medina y Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. En él, Miranda Fricker aclara y delimita los conceptos de injusticia hermenéutica y testimonial, proporcionando ejemplos, narrando su genealogía, respondiendo a algunas de las críticas que recibieron estos conceptos, así como estableciendo relaciones de semejanza y contraste con otras concepciones de la justicia y otras ramas de la filosof…Read more
  •  22
    The Practices of Forgiving: Replies
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3): 336-345. 2019.
  •  123
    Forgiveness—An Ordered Pluralism
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3): 241-260. 2019.
    There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of o…Read more
  •  128
    Bernard Williams as a Philosopher of Ethical Freedom
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8): 919-933. 2020.
    Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if…Read more
  •  15
    John McDowell, Mind and World (review)
    Women’s Philosophy Review 18 93-94. 1998.
  •  7
    Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism – Reweaving the Social Fabric (review)
    Women’s Philosophy Review 17 33-34. 1997.
  •  166
    The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique. Axel Honneth’s rich account focuses our attention on recognition’s role in securing basic self-confidence, moral self-respect, and self-esteem. With these loci of recognition in place, we are enabled to raise the intriguing question whether each of these may be extended to apply specifically to the epistemic dim…Read more
  •  32
    Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the…Read more
  •  47
    Why 'Female Intuition'?
    Women’s Philosophy Review 15 36-44. 1996.
  •  12
  •  114
    The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (edited book)
    with Peter Graham, David Henderson, and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen
    Routledge. 2019.
  •  144
    Ambivalence About Forgiveness
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 161-185. 2018.
    Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological me…Read more
  •  54
    Editorial
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1): 1-1. 2018.
  •  169
    Replies to critics
    Theoria 23 (1): 81-86. 2008.
    Replies.
  •  388
    I—Miranda Fricker: The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 151-177. 2010.
    Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lig…Read more
  •  123
    Alice Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2): 311-315. 2010.
  •  554
    In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also h…Read more
  •  236
    The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2000.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of …Read more
  •  517
    Rational authority and social power: Towards a truly social epistemology
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2). 1998.
    This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, …Read more