•  384
    The minimal self needs a social update
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (7): 1057-1065. 2016.
    REVIEW ESSAY The minimal self needs a social update Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame, by Dan Zahavi, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 304 pp.
  •  291
    The Body Social: An Enactive Approach to the Self
    Frontiers in Psychology 5 1-16. 2014.
    This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a …Read more
  •  118
    It has been argued that Extended Cognition (EXT), a recently much discussed framework in the philosophy of cognition, would serve as the theoretical basis to account for the impact of Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) on the self and life of patients with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS). In this paper I will argue that this claim is unsubstantiated, EXT is not the appropriate theoretical background for understanding the role of BCI in LIS. I will critically assess what a theory of the extended self would…Read more
  •  78
    Locked-in syndrome: a challenge for embodied cognitive science
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3): 517-542. 2015.
    Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied…Read more
  •  30
    The Fragile Nature of the Social Mind: a commentary on Alva Noë.
    In Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt (eds.), Open MIND, Mit. pp. 0-0. 2016.
    In this paper I argue that while Noë’s actionist approach offers an excellent elaboration of classical approaches to conceptual understanding, it risks underestimating the role of social interactions and relations. Noë’s approach entails a form of body-based individualism according to which understanding is something the mind does all by itself. I propose that we adopt a stronger perspective on the role of sociality and consider the human mind in terms of socially enacted autonomy. On this view,…Read more
  •  24
    In this paper we focus on the psychiatric approach of Open Dialogue and seek to explain why the intersubjective process of dialogue, one of OD’s core clinical principles, is effective in schizophrenia treatment. We address this question from an interdisciplinary viewpoint, by linking the OD approach with a theoretical account of the self as endorsed by enactive cognitive science. The paper is structured as follows: first, we introduce the OD approach and focus in particular on the principles tha…Read more
  •  23
    The enactive approach and disorders of the self - the case of schizophrenia
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4): 591-616. 2016.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we s…Read more
  •  17
    This paper looks to phenomenology and enactive cognition in order to shed light on the self and sense of self of patients with locked-in syndrome. It critically discusses the concept of the minimal self, both in its phenomenological and ontological dimension. Ontologically speaking, the self is considered to be equal to a person’s sensorimotor embodiment. This bodily self also grounds the minimal sense of self as being a distinct experiential subject. The view from the minimal bodily self presup…Read more
  • Action-Oriented Understanding of Consciousness and the Structure of Experience
    with Anil Seth, Richard Menary, Paul Verschure, Jamie Turnbull, Martina Martina Martina Al, Judith Ford, Chris Frith, Pierre Jacob, Marek McGann, Ezequiel Di Paolo, and Kevin Andrew Kevin
    In Karl Friston, Andreas Andreas & Danika Kragic (eds.), Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science, M.i.t. Press. pp. 261-281. 2016.