Moa De Lucia De Lucia Dahlbeck

This text deals with a problem concerning processes of the productive power of knowledge. We draw on so called poststructural theories challenging the classical image of thought – as hinged upon a representational logic identifying entities in a rigid sense – when formulating a problem concerning the gap between knowledge and the object of knowledge. More specifically we are looking at this problem in the contexts of sustainable development and childhood using illustrating examples in order to test the validity of these theoretical accounts. The examples we use range from internationally agreed documents claiming universality concerning environmental protection and childhood to national curricula for the pre-school to a Swedish governmentally produced and distributed TV-series called Needle and Stick save the world, addressing the issue of sustainable development. In short, we wish to problematise the rigid positions of the child and the human being in relation to nature

In this article I will argue that the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza may assist us in coming to terms with some of the conceptual challenges that the phenomenon of Artificial Intelligence poses on law and legal thought. I will pursue this argument in three steps. First, I will suggest that Spinoza’s philosophy of the mind and knowledge may function as an analytical tool for making sense of the prevailing conception of AI within the legal discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Then, I will continue the argument with the aid of Spinoza’s political philosophy which partly complicates the picture as it seems to disqualify a normative process grounded directly upon the means stipulated for achieving a robust understanding of AI. Based on these two separate discussions I will conclude by outlining a composite critique – from the twofolded perspective of Spinoza’s ethical and political discussions – of the ongoing negotiations of a new Conventional Weapons Convention protocol on LAWS.

ABSTRACTWhile Spinoza stipulates an ideal moral person in the propositions on the ‘free man’ in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of political relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his exemplar on the idea of a supremely moral person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. We argue that the purpose of this is to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people and communities in ethical self-transformation.

For some time now, the world in general and international law in particular have witnessed one and the same widespread call for action. Both public and private interests claim that present-day standards and technology have proven insufficient for saving the natural environment. From this claim has emerged a call that entreats us to approach the problem of the deteriorating natural environment by including nature into our moral considerations. The current study focuses on analyzing what is arguably one of the most influential and widely recognized expressions of this call for action: the report series entitled Harmony with Nature: Report of the Secretary General. The study aims to argue that the Reports’ outline of a new ethics can be understood as being underpinned by the metaphysical system of early rationalist Benedict Spinoza. Given Spinoza’s understanding of nature and morality, however, there is reason to critically evaluate the plausibility of naturalizing international environmental law, as requested by the reports. The rationale behind the present study is therefore to provide a thorough review of Spinoza’s metaphysical philosophy so as to arrive at an adequate understanding of his ethics and moral theory, and evaluate international environmental law in light of this understanding so as to be able to assess the practical effects of including nature into the moral considerations of the international legal order

This book addresses the use of Benedict Spinoza's philosophy in current attempts to elaborate an ecological basis for international environmental law. Because the question of environmental protection has not been satisfactory resolved, the legal debate concerning our responsibility for the environment has - as evidenced in the recent UN report series Harmony with Nature - come to invite calls for a new eco-centric, rather than anthropocentric, legal paradigm. In this respect, Spinoza appears as a key figure. He is one of the few philosophers in the history of western philosophy who cares, and writes extensively, about the roots of anthropocentrism; the core issue of contemporary normative debates in ecology. And in response to the rapidly developing ecological crisis, his work has become central to a re-thinking of the human relationship with nature. Addressing the contention that Spinoza's ethics might provide a useful source for developing a new, eco-centred framework for environmental law, this book elaborates a more nuanced understanding of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza cannot, it is argued here, simply be reduced to an eco-ethicist. That is: his metaphysics cannot be used as basis of an essentially naturalised or extended human morality. At the same time, however, this book argues that the radicality of Spinoza's naturalism nevertheless offers the possibility of developing a more adequate ecological basis for environmental law.

Le discours international actuel sur l’écologie s’est mué en un mouvement qui s’identifie avec le discours de la vérité scientifique. L’exemple de Greta Thunberg et de ses appels à l’action illustre dans quelle mesure l’identité actuelle du mouvement enveloppe un paradoxe qui lui est inhérent. D’une part, elle s’appuie sur la nature auto-explicative et claire des idées vraies. D’autre part, pour propager ces idées, elle fait résider son pouvoir rhétorique dans l’impact émotionnel. L’approche par Spinoza de la relation entre raison et foi, telle qu’elle apparaît quand on juxtapose les passages pertinents de l’ Éthique et ceux du Traité théologico-politique qui décrivent la prophétie, constitue un cadre théorique susceptible de rendre compte de ce paradoxe inhérent à l’écologie moderne.

The purpose of legal theory seems to be a perpetually debated issue among legal scholars. Koskenniemi argues that the history of international legal theory is conditioned by a dialectical movement between a position justifying any given positive law based on the power of states, and a position arguing for a theory of the state where laws are justified only in accordance with certain substantial conditions. According to Lauterpacht there is very little support in Spinoza's political philosophy for a “separate and independent theory of international law”. The chapter aims to contextualize the passages pointed to by Lauterpacht in order to investigate whether such an endeavor may produce an understanding of Spinoza's political philosophy that makes it apt to function as a basis for a practical theory of international law. Lauterpacht's critique of Spinoza's statements on international law hinges on the argument that they deviate from his general explanation of the mechanisms of law‐making.