Mohammad Saeedimehr

In some cases, Avicenna used the semantical premises in order to deduce some conclusions in his Physics. For instance, he analyzes five derivatives of the word “tabiat” and then in the light of these analyses, he concludes that the natural properties of an object are caused by its essence and are based on it. Here, the major problem is how to justify Avicenna's passage from semantical premises to physical consequents. This paper shows that through analyzing the relation between nature and its derivatives, on one hand, and explicating Avicenna’s definition of the “nature” on the other hand, we can defend the rationality of such a passage.

According to a traditional view all logical truths are necessary however, this thesis recently has been faced with various critiques from different points of view. Introducing some logical operators, David Kaplan and Edward Zalta claim that there are logical truths regarding common definition ‒ that are not necessary. William Hanson objects Zalta's examples believing that they rely on unjustified presuppositions especially he does not accept real world validity as a proper notion for presenting logical truth. Nelson and Zalta reply to his objections claiming that they have unacceptable grounds. In this paper, we introduce logical truths, then present Kaplan's and Zalta's examples and explore Hanson's objections together with their replies. At last we try to show the metaphysical roots of the debates.

Reflecting on Avicenna’s works indicates that by ‘Dhat’(ذات), when used in the context of universal essences, he means either the quiddity or the nature, and when used in the context of individual essence, especially God’s essence, he means the very existence. The second meaning, i.e. the nature, which is the result of his inquiry about the reality of things, is based on the first one, i.e. the quiddity. According to this second meaning, and througha kind of thought experiment and using human mind’s capacity, Avicenna discusses different aspects of essence and their implications in various sciences. These conceptual analyses help us discover his idea of essentialism. The final conclusion is that Avicenna’s essentialism is consistent with his idea about existence and the definitions can refer to the essence of objects.

Abstract In the light of the analysis of Avicenna’s definition of “nature” we can discover the main principles of his physics, which are: ‘The agency of the nature’, ‘the directness of this agency’, ‘the natural object’, and ‘the essential agency of the nature’. One of the main consequences of this analysis is that the nature could be considered as the direct cause of the motion, immobility and spatial balance of the material objects. Moreover, it shows that natural objects are essentially capable of possess natural properties. Accordingly, Avicenna considers that the natural properties are the same as the essential properties, which material objects have them necessarily.

According to a common definition, the argument of truthful ones is an argument in which the existence of Necessary Being is proved with no presumption of the existence of the possible being. Avicenna proposed different versions of this style of argument and the version in the book of Nejat is one of them. This paper is intended to examine the possibility of proving the logical validity of this version in first-order predicate logic and explain the principles which the argument is based on. In this way, it becomes clear to what extent Avicenna's version is in accordance with the criteria he himself introduces for the argument of truthful ones. In this respect, while providing a clear exposition of the version in the book of Nejat, bugs on some of the statements and proposals to obviate them in terms of replacement arises. Then explaining the concepts and premises which the argument in the book of Nejat is besed on, it is formulated in first-order predicate logic with its full proof. Finally, the proposed model's accordance with the presented criteria for the argument of truthful ones will be shown.

In different parts of Metaphysics, Aristotle presents different views on the nature and subject matter of the discipline in question. These different characterizations led to wide-ranging interpretations of the relation between metaphysics and philosophical theology. Muslim Philosophers adopted two different views. Al-Kindi and al-Farabi endorsed the view that metaphysics is the same as theology as far as its subject matter is the First Cause and it deals essentially with incorporeal entities. After Avicenna, however, a second view became dominant according to which metaphysics has a broader realm that embraces theology as its most noble part. The rationale behind this view is that the subject matter of metaphysics is “being qua being”, or unconditioned existent, in its broad sense so that philosophical theology can be taken as discussing some of the proper accidents of the unconditioned existent. This view requires that metaphysics cannot be a secular discipline and should be totally consistent with theology. It also provides us with a certain interpretation of what is usually called “Islamic philosophy.” * Professor. Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran. Iran. ׀ [email protected]

We can explain “knowing” in Avicenna's thought through higher-order consciousness. He admits unconscious perception both in innate human knowledge namely self-awareness and self-evident concepts and propositions and in sense perceptions, imaginary perceptions, and intellectual perceptions. The difference between conscious and unconscious perceptions is due to the presence of self as the spectator of perception in the earlier and the absence of that in the later. So acquiring knowledge is possible only through presence, attention, and intention of self, hence one knows that she knows. So “knowing” requires higher-order consciousness.

One of the recent questions about happiness is that whether happiness is due to one thing or there is more than one item which leads to happiness and also the other items mentioned as causes of happiness could be considered as introduction to actualize the main cause or not. The first idea which assumes such an end to which all other ends are subordinated is known as "dominant end" and the latter is described as "inclusive end". Scholars attempt to analyze the causes providing happiness based on the extent of their affection on actualizing happiness. In this research we try to review Avicenna’s view about the question. We see that Avicenna identifies the notion of happiness in terms of obtaining perfection in psychic faculty of human and holds that soul has got a two-aspect perfection: intellectual perception is the essential aspect and the other aspect referring to the natural body and dominating it in order to reach the ethical virtues. Avicenna, however, considers the action of ethical virtue as an introduction to intellectual perception and introduces the connection to the Active Intelligence and this very intellectual perception as the real happiness. As a result, he believes that feeling complete pleasure of real perfection is depend on the departure of soul from body and would occur in hereafter. Thus, we can conclude that Avicenna interprets happiness as dominant end.

Michael E. Marmura, an outstanding Avicenna scholar, has presented a special interpretation of Avicenna’s view concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. In this paper, which consists of two parts, we will examine his interpretation of Avicenna. In the first part, we briefly present Marmura’s reading of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. According to Marmura’s interpretation of Avicenna, God only knows, individually, particular entities which are the only member of their species. Also, He knows, individually, particular events which are attributed to such particular entities. Arguing that Avicenna’s theory is not able to explain God’s knowledge of ‘all’ particulars, Marmura concludes that Avicenna ‘believed’ that God does not know all particulars individually. In the second part, we will object his interpretation. The most important criticisms are as follows: he has not determined what problems Avicenna’s theory aims to solve; he has not touched two important elements of Avicenna’s theory, i.e., God’s knowledge of particulars by means of their forms, and God’s knowledge of particulars by means of His causal relation with them; and he presents an erroneous interpretation of Avicenna’s use of the eclipse example.

According to a doctrine widely held by most medieval philosophers and theologians, whether in the Muslim or Christian world, there are no metaphysical distinctions in God whatsoever. As a result of the compendious theorizing that has been done on this issue, the doctrine, usually called the doctrine of divine simplicity, has been bestowed a prominent status in both Islamic and Christian philosophical theology. In Islamic philosophy some well-known philosophers, such as Ibn Sina (980–1037) and Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), developed this doctrine through a metaphysical approach. In this paper, considering the historical order, I shall first concentrate on Ibn Sina’s view. Then I shall turn to the theory of divine simplicity of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), as the most developed and comprehensive version of the medieval theories in Christian world. Finally, I will return to Islamic philosophy and explore the more complicated and mature account of the doctrine as it was introduced by Mulla Sadra according to his own philosophical principles.