•  41
    Sunday School Student and Theological Fatalism
    Sophia 52 (3): 553-555. 2013.
    I will briefly argue that theological fatalism is not a genuine ‘theological’ problem, for it can be reduced to another alleged incompatibility that arises independently of the existence or non-existence of God. I will conclude that the way of arguing against the existence of God or His omniscience by appealing to theological fatalism is blocked for libertarian atheists
  •  23
    Avicenna on the Nature of Mathematical Objects
    Dialogue 55 (3): 511-536. 2016.
    Some authors have proposed that Avicenna considers mathematical objects, i.e., geometric shapes and numbers, to be mental existents completely separated from matter. In this paper, I will show that this description, though not completely wrong, is misleading. Avicenna endorses, I will argue, some sort of literalism, potentialism, and finitism.
  •  19
    The Strong Version of Underdetermination of Theories by Empirical Data: Comments on Woleński's Analysis
    with Mostafa Taqavi
    Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 13 (1): 111-117. 2008.
    The Polish researcher in the field of logic and philosophy, Jan Woleński, in one of his recent articles, "Metalogical Observations About the Underdetermination of Theories by Empirical Data," logically formalized two weak and strong versions of the underdetermination of theories by empirical data (or UT by abbreviation) and with these formalization has metalogically analyzed these two versions. Finally he has deducted that the weak version is defensible while the strong version is not. In this p…Read more
  •  8
    On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality
    Acta Analytica 33 (4): 453-462. 2018.
    The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane’s psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the r…Read more