•  1126
    According to various “harm-based” approaches to the non-identity problem, an action that brings a particular child into existence can also harm that child, even if his or her life is worth living. In the third chapter of The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People, David Boonin surveys a variety of harm-based approaches and argues that none of them are successful. In this paper I argue that his objections to these various approaches do not impugn a harm-based approach that Boonin do…Read more
  •  857
    A harm based solution to the non-identity problem
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2 427-444. 2015.
    Many of us agree that we ought not to wrong future people, but there remains disagreement about which of our actions can wrong them. Can we wrong individuals whose lives are worth living by taking actions that result in their very existence? The problem of justifying an answer to this question has come to be known as the non-identity problem.[1] While the literature contains an array of strategies for solving the problem,[2] in this paper I will take what I call the harm-based approach, and I wi…Read more
  •  346
    What Is Harming?
    In J. McMahan, T. Campbell, J. Goodrich & K. Ramakrishnan (eds.), Principles and Persons: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, Oxford University Press. 2021.
    A complete theory of harming must have both a substantive component and a formal component. The substantive component, which Victor Tadros (2014) calls the “currency” of harm, tells us what I interfere with when I harm you. The formal component, which Tadros calls the “measure” of harm, tells us how the harm to you is related to my action. In this chapter I survey the literature on both the currency and the measure of harm. I argue that the currency of harm is well-being and that the measure of …Read more
  •  253
    Our Duties to Future Generations
    Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 2013.
    In this dissertation, I explicate some of the moral duties we have to future humans. I defend the view that (DV1) we have pro tanto duties of nonmaleficence and beneficence to and regarding at least some future humans; (DV2) in the present circumstances, this duty of nonmaleficence grounds reasons for us to refrain from damaging certain features of the natural environment; and (DV3) in the present circumstances, this duty of beneficence grounds reasons for at least some of us to bring future hum…Read more
  •  245
    A Deontological Approach to Future Consequences
    In Stephen M. Gardiner (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Intergenerational Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2022.
    This chapter defends a deontological approach to both the non-identity problem and what is referred to as the “inconsequentiality problem.” Both problems arise in cases where, although the actions of presently living people appear to have harmful consequences for future people, it is difficult to explain why there are moral reasons against such actions. The deontological response to both problems appeals to a distinction between causal and non-causal consequences. By acknowledging the moral impo…Read more
  •  226
    Suffering and Meaning in the Lives of Wild Animals
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46 355-371. 2022.
    This article advances some considerations that undermine the overall justification for what I call “beneficent interventions,” or interventions aimed at reducing the suffering of wild animals. I first appeal to Susan Wolf’s (2010) account of meaning in life to argue that wild animals can and do have meaning in their lives. I then argue that the meaning in animal lives can offset their suffering, making their lives more worth living. This source of positive value in the lives of wild animals unde…Read more
  •  189
    On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1): 73-87. 2017.
    _ Source: _Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 73 - 87 According to action-relative accounts of harming, an action harms someone only if it makes her worse off in some respect than she would have been, had the action not been performed. Action-relative accounts can be contrasted with effect-relative accounts, which hold that an action may harm an individual in virtue of its effects on that individual, regardless of whether the individual would have been better off in the absence of the action. In this paper,…Read more
  •  185
    Beneficence and procreation
    Philosophical Studies 173 (2): 321-336. 2016.
    Consider a duty of beneficence towards a particular individual, S, and call a reason that is grounded in that duty a “beneficence reason towards S.” Call a person who will be brought into existence by an act of procreation the “resultant person.” Is there ever a beneficence reason towards the resultant person for an agent to procreate? In this paper, I argue for such a reason by appealing to two main premises. First, we owe a pro tanto duty of beneficence to future persons; and second, some of u…Read more
  •  124
    Persons, Animals, and Psychological Unity
    Philosophical Studies 180 (4): 1197-1209. 2023.
    In this paper I consider whether psychological unity can moderate moral status. I first explicate a hybrid view on which non-person animals have a utilitarian moral status and persons have a deontological moral status. I then discuss Jeff McMahan's (2002) concept of psychological unity, and I motivate the view that differences in psychological unity might affect the strength of our reasons against harming different individuals. Ultimately, however, I reject the claim that differences in moral st…Read more
  •  122
    How Lives Measure Up
    Acta Analytica 28 (1): 31-48. 2013.
    The quality of a life is typically understood as a function of the actual goods and bads in it, that is, its actual value. Likewise, the value of a population is typically taken to be a function of the actual value of the lives in it. We introduce an alternative understanding of life quality: adjusted value. A life’s adjusted value is a function of its actual value and its ideal value (the best value it could have had). The concept of adjusted value is useful for at least three reasons. First, i…Read more
  •  120
    When Good Things Happen to Harmed People
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4): 893-908. 2019.
    The problem of justified harm is the problem of explaining why it is permissible to inflict harm for the sake of future benefits in some cases but not in others. In this paper I first motivate the problem by comparing a case in which a lifeguard breaks a swimmer’s arm in order to save her life to a case in which Nazis imprison a man who later grows wiser as a result of the experience. I consider other philosophers’ attempts to explain why the lifeguard’s action was permissible but the Nazis’ act…Read more
  •  51
    The Interspecies Killing Problem
    In Mylan Engel & Gary Lynn Comstock (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals, Lexington Books. pp. 119-139. 2016.
  •  41
    Cut the fat! Defending trans fats bans
    American Journal of Bioethics 10 (3). 2010.
    Is banning trans fat a bad policy? Resnik (2010) offers two general reasons for thinking so. First, because trans fat bans could lead to the government’s placing other objectionable restrictions upon food choices. Second, that, because we can adequately reduce trans fat consumption through education and mandatory labeling, bans are unnecessary. There are good reasons to reject both claims. First, since any slippery slope towards further restrictions on food choices is easily avoided, trans fat b…Read more
  •  38
    The Ethics of Policing and Imprisonment (edited book)
    Springer Verlag. 2018.
    This volume considers the ethics of policing and imprisonment, focusing particularly on mass incarceration and police shootings in the United States. The contributors consider the ways in which non-ideal features of the criminal justice system―features such as the prevalence of guns in America, political pressures, considerations of race and gender, and the lived experiences of people in jails and prisons―impinge upon conclusions drawn from more idealized models of punishment and law enforcement…Read more
  •  34
    Retribution, Deterrence, and Organ Donation
    American Journal of Bioethics 11 (10). 2011.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 10, Page 7-9, October 2011
  •  22
    How functionalist and process approaches to behavior can explain trait covariation
    with Dustin Wood and P. D. Harms
    Psychological Review 122 (1): 84-111. 2015.
  •  19
    Suffering and Meaning in the Lives of Wild Animals
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46 355-371. 2022.
    This article advances some considerations that undermine the overall justification for what I call “beneficent interventions,” or interventions aimed at reducing the suffering of wild animals. I first appeal to Susan Wolf’s (2010) account of meaning in life to argue that wild animals can and do have meaning in their lives. I then argue that the meaning in animal lives can offset their suffering, making their lives more worth living. This source of positive value in the lives of wild animals unde…Read more
  •  8
    Personal Identity in Black Mirror
    with Robert Sloane
    In David Kyle Johnson (ed.), Black Mirror and Philosophy, Wiley. 2019.
    Can the characters in Black Mirror survive the loss of their bodies? This chapter considers what happens to characters like Greta in White Christmas, Clayton in Black Museum, and Yorkie in San Junipero when artificial models are made of their minds. One possibility is that the original characters persist in cookie form, without their bodies, but retaining the essence of who they originally were. Another possibility is that cookies cannot replicate a person's essence: instead, each time a cookie …Read more